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ABSTRACT 
This study, which examines the role of public–private partnerships in international 
agricultural research, is intended to provide policymakers, research managers, and 
business decisionmakers with an understanding of how such partnerships operate and 
how they potentially contribute to food security and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
The study examines public–private partnerships in light of persistent market 
failure, institutional constraints, and systemic weaknesses, which impede the exchange of 
potentially pro-poor knowledge and technology. The study focuses on three key issues: 
whether public–private partnerships contribute to reducing the cost of research, whether 
they add value to research by facilitating innovation, and whether they enhance the 
impact of research on smallholders and other marginalized groups in developing-country 
agriculture. 
The study examines 75 projects undertaken by the research centers and programs 
of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in partnership 
with various types of private firms. Data and information were obtained through 
document analysis, semi-structured interviews with key informants, and an email survey 
of CGIAR centers. The resulting analysis provides a characterization of public–private 
partnerships in the CGIAR and describes the factors that contribute to their success. 
These finding are important to improving both public policy and organizational practices 
in the international agricultural research system. 
Keywords: Agricultural R&D, CGIAR, innovation, public–private partnerships  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The changing nature of science, technology, and innovation in developing-country 
agriculture necessitates new approaches to conducting research and development (R&D). 
Public–private partnerships in agricultural R&D are increasingly viewed as an effective 
means of conducting advanced research, commercializing new technologies, and 
deploying new products for the benefit of small-scale, resource-poor farmers; food-
insecure consumers; and other marginalized groups in developing countries. The purpose 
of this study is to examine how public–private partnerships, or PPPs, in agricultural R&D 
stimulate greater investment in pro-poor science, technology, and innovation in 
developing-country agriculture. 
PPPs are commonly defined as collaborations between public- and private-sector 
entities in which partners jointly plan and execute activities with a view to accomplishing 
mutually agreed-upon objectives while sharing the costs, risks, and benefits incurred in 
the process. Collaborations of this type can help overcome many of the impediments 
posed by market failure, institutional constraints, and systemic weaknesses in agricultural 
research by building on complementarities, exploiting synergies, and distributing costs 
and risk between the public and private sectors. There is, however, limited rigorous 
analysis of the role of PPPs in the context of developing-country agriculture to confirm 
that they are actually fulfilling this role. This study attempts to fill this gap by analyzing 
75 projects undertaken by the research centers of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in partnership with various types of private firms.
1 Key 
research questions examined in this study are as follows. 
First, do public–private partnerships reduce the costs of research? Research cost 
management is important to centers facing increasingly restricted funding from donors, 
and to firms looking for a cost-based edge over the competition. Thus, the issues are 
whether PPPs reduce research costs by realizing complementarities and scale economies; 
                                                 
1 Established in 1971, the CGIAR is a nonprofit alliance of countries, international and regional 
organizations, and private foundations to mobilize agricultural science to reduce poverty, foster well being, 
promote agricultural growth, and protect the environment. The CGIAR supports 15 international centers 
that work with national research systems, civil society, and the private sector to achieve these goals.  
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whether they reduce research costs to the extent of making feasible those projects that are 
otherwise prohibitively costly when undertaken in isolation; and whether these reductions 
offset the coordination costs associated with a PPP. 
Second, do public–private partnerships facilitate innovation? Innovation processes 
rely on practical outcomes—that is, the introduction of information and knowledge into 
socially or economically relevant products and practices. The issue is thus whether 
interactions between centers and private firms move research from proof of concept to 
product deployment, and whether these same interactions promote co-innovation or the 
creation of new knowledge otherwise unattainable by either agent acting independently.  
  Third, do public–private partnerships enhance impact by increasing outreach to 
the poor? A significant portion of the work undertaken by the international agricultural 
research system is targeted to developing knowledge and technologies that serve the 
needs of vulnerable social groups in developing countries. The issue is thus whether PPPs 
are sufficiently pro-poor to justify further investment, and whether these investments are 
appropriately balanced between short-term goals—that is, moving technologies off the 
shelf and to vulnerable groups through new or alternative distribution channels—and 
long-term goals—accessing cutting-edge science and technology to conduct research 
with potentially positive impacts for these same groups. 
Data for this study were obtained from three sources: an analysis of CGIAR 
system, center, and program documents relating to PPP projects; semi-structured 
interviews with key informants directly or indirectly engaged in the partnerships; and an 
email survey of CGIAR centers on projects involving PPPs.
2  
Findings suggest that centers and their private-sector partners are exploring a 
variety of PPP-based approaches to conducting R&D. Each new approach brings with it 
innovative solutions to improving project management and financial incentives; 
navigating complex legal, contractual, and regulatory frameworks; managing and 
mitigating risk; and marshaling greater political interest and will behind PPPs. However, 
                                                 
2 Details of these PPP projects are available in a searchable online database at 
http://ifpri.catalog.cgiar.org/pppdbase.htm.   
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the potential benefits of PPPs have yet to be fully realized in the CGIAR, suggesting that 
extensive challenges remain. 
Thus, this study attempts to provide stakeholders—policymakers, research 
managers, and business decisionmakers—with a greater understanding of how PPPs 
operate in international agricultural research; how opportunities for synergies in research 
can be better exploited; how problems and pitfalls can be avoided; and how the potential 
costs, benefits, and risks of research can be distributed more equitably across the public 
and private sectors. 
This study is presented as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the literature on 
PPPs in research and, more specifically, in agricultural research. Section 3 sets forth a 
conceptual framework for in-depth analysis of PPPs in agricultural research. Section 4 
details the methods and data used in this study, followed by a discussion of results and 
findings in Section 5. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.  
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
PPPs are commonly defined as collaborations between public- and private-sector entities 
in which partners jointly plan and execute activities to accomplish agreed-upon 
objectives while sharing the costs, risks, and benefits incurred in the process. On 
occasion, however, this definition is too narrow to capture the richness of experience 
gained from other types of interactions between the public and private sectors. Hence, the 
definition is expanded in this paper to include any type of formal or informal arrangement 
between public- and private-sector entities, such as knowledge-sharing networks, 
technology financing, or subcontracted research.
3  
  The term public–private partnership first came into popular use during the 1980s 
in the search for alternatives to the privatization of public services. These PPPs focused 
primarily on outsourcing public services to private operators in the fields of education, 
health, and infrastructure, or more comprehensive programs of urban and rural economic 
development that directly engage both the public and private sectors (Osborne and 
Boughn 1990; Gerrard 2001). Arguably, such PPPs offered an alternative to privatization 
by combining assets from both the public and private sectors to improve efficiency and 
reduce risk, while balancing the private sector’s standard profit motives with contractual 
limitations on the accumulation of profits.  
Since their emergence, PPPs have been the focus of extensive study in a variety of 
disciplines, including economics, public administration, and management science. A 
survey by Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000) divides the literature on research 
partnerships into three analytical categories:  
1.  industrial organization approaches that focus on analyzing the economics of 
inherent failures in the market for scientific and technological knowledge;  
2. transaction-cost  theory  approaches that address the implicit costs of producing 
and exchanging knowledge under different institutional regimes and 
organizational structures; and  
                                                 
3 For more nuanced discussions of definitions, see Linder 1999; Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas 2000; 
and Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002.  
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3.  strategic management approaches that examine how firms compete, network, 
or collude in an effort to accumulate and deploy resources and capabilities to 
strengthen their market positions.
4 
A fourth category, the innovation systems approach, examines how collaborations 
between public and private agents in the generation, exchange, and use of knowledge are 
conditioned by internal behaviors, practices, and routines, and by the external social and 
economic context within which they operate (see, for example, OECD 1998). 
  In the field of science and technology, PPPs are typically designed to enhance 
sectoral competitiveness by combining resources from the public and private sectors to 
achieve economies of scale and scope, exploit complementarities, and realize synergies in 
R&D (von Hippel 1988; Doz 1996; Reid, Bussiere, and Greenaway 2001). This literature 
review, while by no means exhaustive, examines key studies to shed light on the 
conceptual foundations, methodological approaches, and empirical evidence on PPPs in 
science and technology, specifically with regard to developing-country agriculture. 
Terminology, Typologies, and Measurements 
As a starting point, we examine the term “partner” in closer detail. Rarely is there a 
common understanding of what constitutes a public- or private-sector partner in the 
literature on PPPs. Farmers, for instance, are often considered private-sector partners 
when their participation is critical to the conduct of research, such as in a participatory 
research project or in product testing. But since farmers might also be defined as the 
beneficiaries, clients, or end-users of research outputs, they are omitted from our 
definition of partner. Farmer organizations and producer associations operating on a 
commercial basis are nevertheless included because they operate collectively as 
organizations not unlike a firm (Table 1). 
                                                 
4 The study by Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000) examines research partnerships in the 
manufacturing sectors of industrialized countries only, drawing empirical evidence from the United States, 
Europe, and Japan to provide insight into the reasons why firms participate in research partnerships; 
nonetheless, many of the findings are relevant and applicable to the present study.  
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Table 1. A classification of public–private partners 
Classification  Type of organization  Example of organization 
Private  Local firm (registered in a single developing 
country) 
Western Seed Co. (Kenya) 
  Foreign firm (registered or operating in a 
single industrialized country) 
Li-Cor (United States) 
  Regional firm (registered or operating in 
more than one developing country) 
SeedCo (Zimbabwe) 
  Multinational firm (registered or operating in 
multiple countries) 
Monsanto (United States) 
 
  Farmer or producer organization 
 
La Federación de Productores de Arroz 
(Colombia)  
 Industry  association 
 
Croplife International (Belgium) 
World Cocoa Federation (United States) 
  Private research organization 
 
Centro de Investigaciones en Palma de 
Aceite (Colombia) 
  Charitable foundation  Monsanto Fund (United States) 
Barwale Foundation (India)  
Public  National agricultural research organization  Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute 
(Kenya) 
  International agricultural research center 
 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT); International Centre of 
Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) 
  Public university  Huazhong Agricultural University (China) 
  Advanced research institute  Institute for Genomic Research (United 
States) 
  International/development organization  United Nations Development Program 
 
Civil society  Nongovernmental organization  Save the Children (United States) 
  Community-based organization  Local village organizations associations  
Source: Authors. 
  Philanthropic or charitable organizations pose a similar classification problem. 
While their motives are often comparable to those of bilateral or multilateral donor 
organizations, they may also have close associations with their corporate parent that 
influence their activities. For the purposes of this paper, charitable foundations are 
considered private-sector partners where a corporate entity can be directly associated 
with the funding, governance, or activities of the foundation. Thus, philanthropic 
organizations, such as the Rockefeller or Ford Foundations, that have no connection with  
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an identifiable corporate parent are not considered private-sector partners, while the 
Barwale Foundation or the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture are. 
  Next, we examine the ways in which PPPs are categorized, a difficult task given 
the context-specificity of each partnership. For example, PPPs may be classified 
according to the form that knowledge takes within the partnership. This may refer to the 
nature of its appropriability, such as a pure public good (nonexcludable and nonrival), a 
pure private good (excludable and rival), or some form in between (Dalrymple 2006). 
This may also refer to its underlying nature, such as scientific or technical knowledge, or 
organizational or managerial knowledge, as well as codified and explicit knowledge, or 
tacit and implicit (Arrow 1962; Howells 1995; Hall et al. 2002). Or it may refer to the 
origin of the knowledge, for example, from foreign sources of discovery or through 
reorganization of internal and indigenous practices (Clark 2002; Malerba 2002). 
  Other taxonomic properties highlight the ways in which knowledge is generated, 
exchanged, and used within a PPP—that is, how partners define a problem then generate 
and ultimately apply the knowledge needed to solve it. The conventional approach 
describes a continuum from basic, to strategic, to applied, to adaptive research (for 
example, Lele and Coffman 1996). Other studies add the concept of imitation to this 
continuum (Arnold and Bell 2001), while still others emphasize the importance of 
differential learning processes obtained through the partnership process and differences in 
the accessibility and accumulation of knowledge over time or among agents––a property 
that partly depends on an agent’s capacity to exchange, learn, and absorb (Revilla, Sarkis, 
and Acosta 2005).  
  Still other key taxonomic properties include type of partner, size of partner 
(measurable in terms of funding, revenues, R&D investments, or other such metrics), 
extent of collaboration, roles and responsibilities, stage of research, type of output, type 
of actors, organizational form, geographic specification, the number of PPPs engaged in 
by a single actor, and the purpose of the PPP (Anderson, McNiven, and Rose 2002). 
  These properties allow for analysis of different types of collaborations between 
the public and private sectors, ranging from formal, codified technology transfers  
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between public and private research organizations to informal networks of innovators and 
entrepreneurs studying new production techniques or ways of supplying goods to market. 
Codified knowledge-management approaches, for example, are often associated with 
structured relationships among partners to transfer knowledge through formal 
arrangements, such as partnership agreements, material transfer agreements, licensing, 
contracting, or other tools to maintain formal management of the knowledge sharing 
process. Tacit knowledge-management approaches rely more on intangible, social aspects 
of interaction among partners to transfer and integrate knowledge, such as learning-by-
doing, scientific employee exchanges, participatory and action research, and other 
learning-oriented processes. 
  Alternatively, Schaeffer and Loveridge (2002) categorize research collaborations 
by distinguishing among several different models: 
1.  follower–leader models, based on upfront public investments made to reduce 
the costs and risks to subsequent investment by the private sector;  
2.  buyer–seller arrangements, where public agencies contract private firms to 
provide goods or services; 
3.  joint ventures, where the public and private sectors invest in well-defined 
time-bound projects that involve some degree of joint decisionmaking and 
risk-sharing; and 
4.  PPPs, characterized by a greater degree of joint decisionmaking and risk-
sharing, along with a tendency toward more open-ended relationships. 
Using their classification system, a joint venture would include an arrangement whereby 
a firm provides a university with a patent to promote further research, in return securing 
the rights to that research. A PPP, on the other hand, would describe an arrangement 
whereby a public university grants a startup firm with exclusive rights over a patent in 
exchange for an equity position in the firm.  
  Link (2002) classifies PPPs in the context of the U.S. research system as  
(a) technology development partnerships, (b) industrial problem-solving partnerships,  
(c) technology financing partnerships, (d) start-up assistance, and (e) teaming or strategic 
joint-research alliances. His taxonomy compares the economic objectives for creating 
partnerships against the public resources they mobilize. Economic objectives include  
  9 
leveraging public R&D funds, enhancing industrial competitiveness, and leveraging 
industrial R&D, while public resources are described as financial, research, and 
infrastructural resources. He finds that cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) provide 
strategic access to all three forms of public resources to achieve the primary objective of 
leveraging public R&D.  
  This particular model has proven effective in promoting the commercialization of 
public agricultural research in the United States (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie 2000; Fuglie 
and Schimmelpfennig 2000; Parker, Castillo, and Zilberman 2001).
5 It also mirrors many 
of the goals and resourcing strategies of PPPs in the CGIAR, as will be demonstrated 
later. 
The Study of Public–Private Partnerships in Developing-Country 
Agriculture  
PPPs in agricultural R&D are increasingly popular in development-community rhetoric 
(see, for example, DFID 2003, USAID 2004, and WEF 2005). PPPs are expected to 
benefit public research systems by providing access to cutting-edge research tools, 
materials and proprietary knowledge; regulatory experience and skills needed to carry 
products through regulatory processes; and the know-how associated with product 
development, deployment, and marketing (Pray 2001; Pingali and Traxler 2002; 
Spielman and von Grebmer 2006). Such arrangements are also expected to benefit private 
firms by providing access to emerging markets in developing countries; locally specific 
scientific expertise and genetic materials; and opportunities to strengthen corporate social 
responsibility programs, corporate image, brand recognition among customers and the 
general public, and investor confidence (Byerlee and Fischer 2002; Hall and Yoganand 
2004; Reinhardt 2004; Hall 2005). 
                                                 
5 See Naseem, Omamo, and Spielman (2006) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of 
private investment in agricultural R&D, the market and institutional constraints that limit private 
investment growth, and the incentive mechanisms that can strengthen private investment responses in 
agricultural R&D—from both demand and supply sides—particularly in relation to pro-poor growth in 
developing countries.  
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  The popularity of PPPs also stems from an environment of weak growth in public 
R&D expenditure in many developing countries and growth in private sector investment 
in the global agricultural R&D sector (Table 2).  
Table 2. Public- and private-sector expenditure on agricultural research, c. 2000 
  Expenditure 
(2000 million U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted)
a 
Share of total expenditure 
(percentage) 






12,819 862  13,682    93.7  6.3 
Industrialized 
countries 
10,191 12,086 22,277    45.7  54.3 
Total 23,010  12,948  35,958    64.0  36.0 
Source:  Pardey et al. 2006.  
a Figures are expressed as real expenditures, calculated by deflating nominal expenditures in local currency 
using a 2000 price deflator and converting to U.S. dollars using purchasing power parity exchange rates for 
2000. 
  To be sure, public expenditure on agricultural R&D is growing slowly in many 
developing countries and stagnating in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Beintema 
and Stads 2006; Pardey et al. 2006) (Figure 1). And while the decline in donor funding 
for agriculture has reversed itself since 2003 with new donor commitments and new 
funding vehicles and programs, the long-term effects of the 15-year decline in research 
funding are evident in the quality of research infrastructure and scientific personnel in 
many developing countries. Private expenditure on agricultural R&D, on the other hand, 
is growing rapidly in some developing countries with increased domestic and global 
market opportunities, progress in the development of advanced agricultural technology, 
and stronger regulatory regimes that favor private investment (Pray and Fuglie 2001; 
Pray 2002).   
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Figure 1. Public spending on agricultural R&D, by region, 1981–2000 
Source: Pardey et al. 2006. 
Many of the studies on PPPs in developing-country agriculture focus on 
agricultural biotechnology, biosafety regulation, intellectual property rights (IPR), and 
ways in which proprietary knowledge can be transferred from the private sector in 
support of pro-poor PPPs. See, for example, Pray (2001) on biotechnology PPPs in 
Brazil, China, and India; Rausser (1999), Rausser, Simon, and Ameden (2000), and 
Byerlee and Fischer (2002) on IPR management tools to facilitate technology transfers 
and manage risks in agbiotech PPPs; and Krattiger (2002), Roy and Christy (2005), and 
Spielman, Cohen, and Zambrano (2006) on regulatory regimes to enable PPPs that 
accelerate the deployment of agbiotech applications. 
While the emphasis on cutting-edge science and technology is not necessarily 
misplaced, Chataway (2005) and Hall (2005, 2006) suggest the need for greater analysis 
of the organizational practices and behaviors that allow for more effective exploitation of 
PPP–based approaches in agbiotech research. They argue that studies of PPPs (whether in 
Latin America/Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East/North Africa Asia/Pacific 
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agbiotech or otherwise) should emphasize concurrent innovations at the institutional and 
organizational levels, explore more informal partnerships within clusters and networks 
and in more downstream research areas, and take a more systemic approach to 
institutional and organizational change in pursuit of greater innovation in developing-
country agriculture. Hall’s insights capture the importance of evolution in PPPs––that is, 
the movement through sequences of interactive learning cycles that allow for re-
evaluation and readjustment of the collaboration. Studies by Hartwich, González, and 
Vieira (2005) on PPPs in agro-industrial research and Ekboir and Parellada (2002) on 
PPPs to promote zero-tillage cultivation provide useful illustrations of this focus.  
The Study of Public–Private Partnerships in the CGIAR 
Other studies on PPPs focus specifically on the CGIAR given its pivotal role in the 
international agricultural research community. Özgediz and Nambi (1999) examine PPPs 
in the context of other forms of inter-organizational collaborations in the CGIAR, 
offering some of the earliest definitions, typologies, and recommendations for promoting 
partnerships in the system. Their study suggests the need for closer analysis of CGIAR 
partnerships, a better understanding of strategic fit among partners, efforts to build 
mutual trust among partners and exploit the natural role of centers as knowledge brokers, 
and improvement in the management of partnerships.  
  A later study by Binenbaum, Pardey, and Wright (2001) homes in on the issue of 
strategic fit and honest brokerage by examining how the PPP model can be applied to the 
exchange of proprietary knowledge between the CGIAR and the private sector. This 
theme is repeated in a study by Spielman and von Grebmer (2006) that examines why 
this PPP model is not more common in the CGIAR, pointing to mutually negative 
perceptions on the part of both sectors, prohibitive direct and indirect costs, and risks 
associated with the use of proprietary knowledge. Henson-Apollonio (2005) offers 
technical insights into the specific design of collaborative agreements for use by centers 
in exchanging proprietary knowledge with the private sector.  
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Center-specific studies provide further insights into PPPs in the CGIAR. An early 
study by Denning and Bernardo (1995) on partnerships to commercialize improved seed 
and agricultural machinery by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) suggests 
that such efforts incurred significant intangible costs that necessitate further exploration 
of alternative management approaches for partnership-based projects. Other studies 
describing the operating principles of a successful PPP include Patiño and Best (2002) on 
the Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support Cassava Research and 
Development (CLAYUCA) of the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT); 
Reddy, Bussiere, and Greenaway (2001) and Gowda et al. (2004) on the Hybrid Parents 
Research Consortia of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT); and Binenbaum (2006) on the Latin American Fund for Irrigated 
Rice (FLAR).  
A study by Ayele, Chataway, and Wield (2006) examines 12 partnership-based 
agricultural biotechnology projects in Kenya, five of which include CGIAR centers, 
namely the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), the 
International Potato Center (CIP), and ICRISAT. Findings suggest that these partnerships 
tend to be small, donor-dependent, and loosely coordinated; highly supply-driven rather 
than end-user oriented; and limited in scope with respect to their impact on agricultural 
innovation and poverty reduction. 
Several other center-specific studies also highlight the role of PPPs in the context 
of organizational innovation. For example, studies of ICRISAT’s PPP experiences by 
Hall et al. (2003) and Dar and Bantilan (2006) describe how the interplay between public 
and private research actors in PPPs is critical to promoting innovation in the center’s 
organizational behaviors and practices. A study by Smith (2005) of the East Coast Fever 
(ECF) Vaccine project of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) similarly 
describes how the collaborative, disembedded nature of a PPP helps to overcome 
organizational sclerosis and inward-looking tendencies of research organizations, and 
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how a market-oriented, results-based outlook drives partners to produce real outcomes.
6 
A study of watershed research at ICRISAT by Shambu Prasad, Laxmi, and Wani (2006) 
draws similar conclusions about organizational change and institutional learning, as do 
studies of IRRI’s capacity to manage intellectual property by Egelyng (2005) and CIAT’s 
Rural Agroenterprise Development Project by Lundy, Gottret, and Ashby (2005).  
There are, however, few system-level studies of PPPs in the CGIAR. A notable 
exception is a recent study conducted by the CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006) 
of collaborative research projects in the CGIAR. Results from its survey of 14 centers 
show that the private sector represents only 6 percent of the 3,395 organizations working 
in collaboration with the centers, while a second survey of 11 centers shows the private 
sector represents just 4 percent of the centers’ highly relevant collaborations (Figure 2).
7 
The study’s findings suggest that the private sector’s role in the CGIAR is marginal 
relative to the role of its traditional partners in the public sector. 
                                                 
6 Goldberg (2001) also offers insights through a case study analysis of the early stages of the ECF 
vaccine project that highlight associated organizational changes within ILRI. 
7 Note, however, that the CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006) study encounters the same 
definitional problems described earlier, including the term “collaboration.” The report suggests that the 
completeness of information reported by the centers was affected by how the center categorized their 
partners (public, private, civil society, and so on); which unit was involved in the collaboration (that is, 
whether the partnership was conducted at an individual, project, divisional, or organizational level); and 
how information was aggregated (for example, by theme, project, activity, or task).   


































































Source: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat 2006.
 
Notes: N indicates North (that is, industrialized countries); S, South (that is, developing countries); RO, 
regional organizations; SRO, subregional organizations; ARI, advanced research institutes; DEVO, 
development organizations; GO, governmental organizations; and IARC, international agricultural research 
centers. 
  Common to many of the studies on public–private partnerships in the CGIAR 
cited above is the argument that, while PPPs are a constructive means of promoting 
technological, institutional, and organizational innovation, their success often rests on 
meeting the following important requirements:  
•  Clearly defined objectives, roles, and responsibilities that are compatible with 
the incentive structures, competencies, and/or comparative advantages 
associated with individual partners 
•  Bridge-building mechanisms to overcome tensions caused by the cross-
sectoral mistrust, misperceptions, and unclear expectations of partners  
•  Mechanisms to ensure commitment and ownership—that is, ways to ensure 
that all partners contribute to the innovation process; that the relationships 
between partners remain durable and sustainable; and that roles, 
responsibilities, and benefits are distributed equitably  
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• Organizational  innovations—that is, internal changes in structures, behaviors, 
and practices—as well as technological innovation 
•  Tools to manage and mitigate risk both individually and jointly, particularly in 
the context of uncertain research outcomes or a risky research environment  
•  Innovative mechanisms (both formal and informal) to manage the exchange 
and use of knowledge, particularly knowledge that is proprietary or subject to 
some form of IPR 
These findings are examined in detail throughout the remainder of this paper.  
  17 
3.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Conceptually, PPPs are one of several means of organizing the production of some 
output—in this case, agricultural knowledge and technology. The knowledge production 
process is subject not only to the usual constraints imposed by the costs of physical and 
human capital, but also to constraints associated with the exchange and use of 
knowledge. In other words, certain barriers impede the otherwise smooth process of 
exchanging and using knowledge necessary to the innovation process. Here, these 
barriers are described in terms of market failure, institutional constraints, and systemic 
weaknesses, each of which is discussed below (Table 3). 
Table 3. Market failures, institutional constraints, and systemic weaknesses 
Type of failure  Common examples 
Market failure  Public goods research on new agricultural technologies for “orphan” crops 
such as millet, sorghum, roots, and tubers 
Institutional constraints  Absence of IPR regimes to reward innovators; asymmetries of information 
between seed buyers and sellers  




Conventional market failure in the exchange of knowledge results from several factors 
including the public goods characteristics of knowledge (that is, its nonexcludable and 
nonrival properties), limited willingness or ability to pay by farmers with constrained 
market access or purchasing power, the inability of small firms to access the capital 
markets needed to finance knowledge acquisitions, and poor market infrastructure 
(Martin and Scott 2000; Dalrymple 2006).  
A classic example of market failure in agricultural research is commonly found in 
developing-country markets for improved planting materials for “orphan” crops of 
marginal commercial value, such as sorghum, millet, groundnut, pigeonpeas, cassava, or 
sweet potato (Tripp 2000; Herdt 2001). In cases where farmers can replant saved seed, 
capturing the gains conferred by research, and private firms cannot prevent them from  
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doing so through legal or technological means, the profit-maximizing private firm will 
optimally choose not to invest in research, thus creating a chronic undersupply of 
improved seed (see Evenson and Kislev 1973 and Pray and Fuglie 2001). This 
necessitates public-sector intervention in the market, typically through the financing and 
management of plant-breeding programs.  
PPPs attempt to address this market failure in another way—by strengthening 
market and nonmarket incentives for private investment in agricultural research (see Day-
Rubenstein and Fuglie 2000 and Fuglie and Schimmelpfennig 2000). PPPs can encourage 
private investment by implicitly subsidizing the cost of conducting private research, for 
example, by providing access to publicly held plant genetic materials that are otherwise 
difficult for the private sector to access or by providing valuable assistance in navigating 
unfamiliar regulatory or administrative procedures. They can also encourage private 
investment by providing certain externalities appropriable by the firm, for example, by 
assisting firms in their efforts to strengthen corporate image, social responsibility 
programming, and brand recognition as a means of securing support from customers, 
investors, and the general public. 
Institutional Constraints 
Yet the concept of market failure represents just one way of examining impediments to 
the exchange of knowledge. The absence of effective institutions to govern knowledge 
exchange provides another perspective on the problem. Instruments, such as property 
rights regimes and contract enforcement norms are essential to ensuring the costless 
exchange of knowledge. Where they do not exist or are not sufficiently robust, 
knowledge exchange may incur transaction costs above and beyond the actual outlays 
and opportunity costs associated with the exchange (Williamson 1975, 1985).   
Alternatively, institutional mechanisms may emerge to minimize these transaction 
costs, thus encouraging knowledge exchange (Williamson 1991). Returning to our earlier 
example, consider the institutional mechanisms commonly developed in response to 
market failure for improved planting material. IPR, such as plant variety protection and  
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breeders’ rights, are mechanisms developed to reward innovators for their successful 
investments in cultivar improvements, thereby reducing the transaction costs associated 
with contested claims over the rights to innovation rents, while simultaneously 
incentivizing innovative behavior. Similarly, quality assurance and certification systems 
for planting materials are mechanisms designed to address information asymmetries 
resulting from the inability of farmers to make ex ante assessments of seed quality when 
such information is known only by the seller (Tripp and Louwaars 1997; Gisselquist and 
van der Meer 2001; Tripp 2001).  
Where institutional mechanisms are insufficient to facilitate knowledge exchange, 
other organizational mechanisms may emerge. Vertical integration of an entire value 
chain, for example, is a firm’s solution to its inability to otherwise enforce contracts with 
suppliers, ensure timeliness of supply, or control for the quality of inputs to its production 
process (Williamson 1991). In keeping with the example given above, consider the 
approach taken by Monsanto, a multinational cropscience firm, with the introduction of a 
genetically modified insect-resistant cotton cultivar in Mexico. Farmers and gin owners 
were engaged in contracts that obliged farmers to forfeit their right to save seed, while 
farmers were further obliged to accept spot checks of their cultivated land by Monsanto, 
have their cotton ginned in Monsanto-authorized gins only, and accept other provisions 
meant to protect Monsanto’s IPR and its ability to appropriate a portion of the benefits 
accruing from its investments in research (Traxler et al. 2003; Traxler and Godoy-Avila 
2004; Smale et al. 2007). In short, Monsanto organized the production process to address 
its concerns that the legal environment would not provide adequate recourse in the event 
that farmers or ginners replanted or sold saved seed without payment to the firm in 
consideration for its research investment, embodied in the improved cultivars. 
But where such institutional or organizational arrangements are absent or difficult 
to arrange, PPPs are an alternative method of addressing the transaction cost problem. 
PPPs are an organizational arrangement that overcomes such institutional constraints as 
the absence of sufficient regulation and enforcement; the prohibitive costs of exchanging 
knowledge between public and private researchers through market mechanisms; the  
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prohibitive costs of producing knowledge in isolation; or the inability of a given agent to 
use knowledge that is overly complex, context-specific, or dependent on more than one 
agent. 
However, the relative benefits of a PPP over alternative arrangements must also 
be considered against the coordination costs associated with organizing, executing, and 
sustaining the PPP. Coordination costs are typically incurred by efforts undertaken to 
ensure the sustained commitment and participation of parties to a PPP and to prevent 
free-riding, whereby partners minimize their contribution relative to their expected 
benefits. Commitment mechanisms incur costs associated with allocating time and effort 
to strengthening trust, awareness, and leadership; conducting repeated interactions among 
partners; or monitoring other partners’ contributions.  
Systemic Weaknesses 
Such issues suggest the need to dig deeper into the underlying nature of coordination 
among heterogeneous innovation agents. A systems perspective addresses this need by 
providing a more nuanced understanding of agents’ routines, behaviors, and practices; the 
nature of their actions and interactions; and the dynamics of their learning and change 
processes (Nelson and Winter 1982; Lundvall 1988; Metcalfe 1988). The systems 
perspective offers insights into the formal and informal organizational structures, 
routines, procedures, and behaviors needed to create environments that allow individual 
and collective expressions of innovative capabilities (Revilla, Sarkis, and Acosta 2005). 
In the exchange of knowledge, systemic weaknesses are reflected in the inability 
of agents to learn about each other, identify areas of complementarity and synergy, build 
and sustain trust through interpersonal or organizational relationships, communicate and 
exchange ideas effectively, or respond to leadership. For example, while the transfer of a 
transgenic construct from a private firm to a public research organization may provide 
scientists with an important tool to further their research in plant varietal improvement, a 
simple contractual exchange fails to bring with it several implicit elements. This might 
include assurances to the firm that the construct will be carefully stewarded to prevent  
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misuse or abuse, an understanding that the construct will be used for the public good 
rather than private benefit, or an unwritten agreement the construct will be used in 
conjunction with exchanges of the tacit knowledge relating to its effective application 
(see Spielman and von Grebmer 2006).  
Thus, PPPs attempt to address weak innovation systems by opening opportunities 
for interactions and learning processes that can potentially lead to synergistic innovation 
processes. The implementation of a partnership “platform” for example, brings with it not 
only exchanges of resources and materials embedded with technical or scientific 
knowledge, but also exchanges of implicit knowledge, such as routines and behaviors that 
can improve the efficiency of the entire innovation process.   
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4.  METHODS AND DATA 
The conceptual complexity of PPPs described above suggests the need to study not only 
their outcomes and impact—such as farmer adoption rates for a new crop variety or the 
rate of return on a research investment—but also the partnership process and the 
evolution of the partners themselves. To do so, this study relies primarily on qualitative 
methods of inquiry to assemble data and information for analysis. The study uses four 
specific tools—document analysis of PPP–related materials, semi-structured interviews 
with key informants engaged in PPP projects, an email survey of center PPPs, and 
development of a functional typology of PPPs—described below.
8 
Document Analysis 
The analysis of PPP–related documents focused on materials available in the public 
domain and internal materials made available through personal communications. 
Documents examined by the study team included descriptive project literature, project 
evaluations, corporate publications, conference proceedings, press releases, and website 
information obtained from the public domain, as well as documents provided by centers 
and firms, such as material transfer agreements, letters of agreement, terms of reference, 
business plans, commercialization agreements, financial reports, internal presentations, 
personal communications, and partnership engagement policies.  
Additional documentation was extracted from the proceedings of a conference 
held in 2005 on PPPs in international agricultural research (IFPRI 2006). Taken together, 
the document analysis generated an initial inventory of 48 PPPs in the CGIAR. This 
information was then used to identify centers for further study through the key informant 
                                                 
8 Note that this study does not use cost–benefit analysis or scorecard/benchmarking tools to quantify or 
compare PPPs. These potentially valuable tools were not applied here for several reasons. First, these tools 
would require that PPP performance be quantified. This is difficult to do, given that the vast majority of 
PPPs in the CGIAR are ongoing projects with outputs still in the pipeline. Second, tools such as 
scorecard/benchmarking would require some criteria against which to evaluate PPP performance. While the 
CGIAR and center research priorities offer something of a benchmark, comparisons of PPP performance 
against these priorities are often difficult to quantify. Third, the diverse objectives and characteristics of 
PPPs in the CGIAR suggest that comparisons across PPPs, while feasible, may not in fact contribute to an 
understanding how PPPs reduce costs, enhance innovation, and reduce poverty.  
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interviews and to design a CGIAR center survey of PPPs that led to the identification of a 
total of 75 PPPs.
9 
Key Informant Interviews 
Based on the inventory, the study team identified, for further examination, five centers 
currently engaged in PPP projects. Within each center, the study team chose several focal 
PPPs with a view to ensuring some degree of heterogeneity in terms of PPP type and the 
availability and accessibility of partners. A total of six focal PPPs from four centers were 
examined based on information gathered from interviews with key informants drawn 
from public, private, and civil society partners (Table 4).  
  Additional PPPs were also covered in the interviews to obtain supplementary 
information on cross-cutting issues; however, the availability and accessibility of partners 
(particularly from the private sector) were more limited in these cases.
10  
                                                 
9 This figure is inclusive of all CGIAR centers and programs. Note that while the CGIAR Challenge 
Programs were included in the initial document analysis and subsequent interviews, there was no 
information to suggest that components of the existing Challenge Programs were PPPs, as defined here. 
Also note that document analysis was also conducted to determine whether the three centers that did not 
respond to the email survey (described below) were nonetheless involved in PPPs. Results are presented in 
Table 8.  
10 These partnerships included the On-Farm Innovative Enterprises in Watershed Program at ICRISAT, 
Allanblackia Development for Smallholder Cultivation at the World Agroforestry Centre, the Latin 
American Fund for Irrigated Rice at CIAT, and various commercialization activities at the International 
Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE), a non–CGIAR center. The inclusion of ICIPE in this 
study provided insight into alternative partnership approaches taken by a research organization with a 
mission, mandate, and program bearing both similarities to and differences from those of the CGIAR 
centers.  
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Table 4. Focal CGIAR centers and public–partnership projects 
Focal center/location  Focal partnership 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Patencheru, India 
Agribusiness incubator and hybrid parent line 
consortia 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 
Palmira, Colombia 
CLAYUCA and rose powdery mildew research 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), 
Nairobi, Kenya 
East Coast Fever Vaccine research 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT), Nairobi, Kenya 
Striga-resistant maize research 
Source: Authors. 
Note: For a list of the partners in each focal partnership, see the online database accompanying this study, 
at http://ifpri.catalog.cgiar.org/pppdbase.htm.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants drawn from the 
public, private, and civil society sectors (Table 5). The interviews were conducted based 
on a list of questions that were pre-tested at ICRISAT in Patencheru, India, in early 2006 
(Appendix A). Questions were conducted as reflective “conversations” with key 
informants and focused on project objectives, partner goals, operations and management, 
interaction processes, organizational change, and poverty impacts.  
Table 5. Semi-structured interview subjects, by affiliation 
Affiliation  Number of interviews 
International agricultural research organizations  40 





Charitable foundations and donor agencies  4 
Total  75 
Source: Authors. 
a Government agencies include national agricultural research organizations and ministries of agriculture. 
b Nonprofit/nongovernmental organizations include independent entities established to manage a public–
private partnership, organizations engaged in international technology transfer activities, and 
conventionally defined nongovernmental or community-based organizations. 
CGIAR Center Survey 
Supplementary data were gathered from an email survey sent to the director generals of 
the 15 CGIAR centers in May 2006 (Appendix B). A total of 12 centers responded to the  
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survey and follow-up queries, and where responses were incomplete alternative sources 
of information were used. Survey questions were designed to assemble basic information 
on the purpose, partners, outcomes, duration, and budgets of center PPPs. Centers were 
asked to describe the purpose of the partnership in terms of the five functional categories 
described earlier, as well as its goals based on the following four categories:  
1.  to access new scientific knowledge from the private sector, 
2.  to reduce research costs by partnering with the private sector,  
3.  to translate research outputs into products for the poor, and 
4.  to bring the center into closer contact with the poor. 
While the survey was designed to capture PPPs according to the narrow definition 
described earlier, centers were allowed to submit data on interactions with the private 
sector that might fall under the wider definition. This includes, for instance, funding 
relationships with private foundations, research subcontracted to the private sector, and 
research outsourced by the private sector to a center. 
A Functional Typology 
Finally, the study team developed a rudimentary classification of partnerships to capture 
the specific roles played by each partner, the distribution of risk across partners, and the 
overall goals of the partnership (Table 6). This classification can be described in five 
functional categories: 
1.  Resourcing partnerships. CGIAR centers receive funding from philanthropic 
foundations associated with private firms, or they receive scientific expertise 
from private firms.  
2.  Contracting partnerships. CGIAR center facilities or expertise are contracted 
to private firms, or CGIAR centers contract private firms to conduct research. 
3.  Commercializing partnerships. CGIAR centers transfer research findings and 
materials to private firms for commercialization, marketing, and distribution. 
4.  Frontier research partnerships. CGIAR centers jointly undertake research 
activities characterized by some unknown probability of success.  
5.  Sector/value chain development partnerships. CGIAR centers collaborate with 
networks of public, private, and civil society partners to develop a commodity 
subsector or its associated value chain.  
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Table 6. A typology of public–private partnership 
Role 
Hypothetical impact of different 







































financing    Private,






















+ +++ +++ 
Source: Authors. 
Note: + indicates the hypothetical degree of positive impact that the public–private partnership may 
generate in relation to the three goals identified in this study.   
The typology set forth above helps to address the research questions posed by this 
study and sheds light on the policy, institutional, and organizational environment 
underlying PPPs in the CGIAR. This includes topics such as risk management solutions; 
financial incentives; organization and management options; legal, contractual, and 
regulatory guidelines; means of generating interest and political will; and documentation 
of lessons learned from demonstrable successes. Implicitly, these answers can provide 
evidence in the CGIAR on where the system stands with respect to the private sector, and 
how it should direct its priorities in the future.
11 
                                                 
11 The priorities of the CGIAR system are (1) sustaining biodiversity for current and future 
generations; (2) producing more and better food at lower cost through genetic improvements;  
(3) reducing rural poverty through agricultural diversification and emerging opportunities for high-value 
commodities and products; (4) promoting poverty alleviation and sustainable management of water, land, 
and forest resources; and (5) improving policies and facilitating institutional innovation to support 
sustainable reduction of poverty and hunger (CGIAR 2006a).  
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5.  KEY FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
With the parameters of the study defined, data and information assembled can now be 
presented, specifically in terms of the level and size of PPPs in the CGIAR; their types 
and characteristics; and the extent to which they contribute to reducing research costs, 
fostering innovation, or enhancing outreach to the poor. (For further details, see the 
online database at http://ifpri.catalog.cgiar.org/pppdbase.htm.)  
Survey Results and General Descriptors 
The study identified 75 PPPs in the CGIAR that were active in 2004 or later. Of these, 47 
partnerships (63 percent) are concentrated in four of the CGIAR’s larger or older 
commodity centers: CIAT, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, and IRRI (Table 7). 
  Findings show that 43 of the partnerships (57 percent) are collaborations that 
include foreign entities, a category that includes foreign (industrialized-country) firms, 
multinational firms, or international/regional industry associations and charitable 
foundations. An equal number and proportion of partnerships are collaborations that 
include domestic entities, that is, developing-country firms, private research 
organizations, producer associations, and local industry associations and charitable 
foundations (Figure 3). The overlap between these two categories is relatively small: only 
four partnerships engage both foreign and domestic entities (5 percent).  
  Moreover, only 30 PPPs (40 percent) engaged public-sector partners, either 
foreign or domestic. Only 18 PPPs (24 percent) engaged national agricultural research 
organizations in developing countries, organizations that represent the CGIAR’s 
traditional partners.   
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International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)  17  23 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 11  15 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)  10  13 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT)  9  12 
Bioversity International
a   8  11 
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)  6  8 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)  5  7 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)  4  5 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI)  3  4 
World Agroforestry Centre  3  4 
International Potato Center (CIP) 1  1 
International Food Policy Research Center (IFPRI)  1  1 
Africa Rice Center (WARDA)  1  1 
WorldFish Center  0  0 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)  0  0 
Total 75  100 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: A total of 75 partnerships were identified through the survey and other sources; four of these are 
multicenter partnerships. CIFOR, IITA, and the World Agroforestry Centre did not provide survey 
responses. For CIFOR, information on public–private partnerships could not be obtained by any method; 
for IITA, information was obtained through document analysis; for the World Agroforestry Centre, 
information was obtained through document analysis and key informant interviews. 
a Formerly the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI). 
  Findings further show that a high proportion of PPPs in the CGIAR are exclusive 
collaborations. A total of 45 partnerships (60 percent of the total) involve exclusive 
relationships with the private sector that do not involve other public-sector or civil 
society organizations. Further, 32 of these exclusive partnerships (43 percent of the total) 
are also “monogamous,” meaning they involve just one center and one private-sector 
partner. Of these monogamous PPPs, 21 involve foreign entities (66 percent), and, of 
those, multinational firms accounted for slightly less than half (9 partnerships or 12 
percent of the total). The remaining 11 PPPs (34 percent) are collaborations with 
domestic entities. Relatedly, exclusive PPPs with foreign entities tended to be smaller 
(three partners on average) than PPPs with domestic entities or a combination of foreign 
and domestic entities (six partners on average).  








































Project size as measured in terms of annual budget ranges from less than US$5,000 to 
US$923,000, with a mean budget of approximately US$186,000, based on 45 PPPs for 
which financial information was provided. Extrapolating from the available data, PPPs 
represent just 4 percent of the CGIAR’s aggregate financing averaged over the period 
2001–05.  
  Note, however, that these data are subject to several limitations that make both 
system-level analysis and comparisons across PPPs difficult. First, where survey 
responses provide total rather than annual budget data, the budget is determined by 
simply dividing the total budget by the project’s duration. Second, budget data rarely 
include the in-kind contributions of private firms to a PPP. Third, while some data are 
based on the center’s portion of a project budget (possibly, but not necessarily, 
representing outlays for the entire project), others are based on project revenues, that is, 
the income generated to support project operation (Table 8).  
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Table 8. An overview of public–private partnerships in the CGIAR 
Details of partnership  Statistics 
Budget and duration  Mean  Standard deviation 
Annual project budget (U.S. dollars)
a  186,152 234,039 
Project duration (years)  4.2 2.8 
Private-sector partners per partnership
b  1 4.6 
Other partners per partnership
b,c  0 2.7 
Total partners per partnership
b  2 5.6 
Exclusivity and monogamy  Number  Percentage 
Partnerships with foreign private-sector entities only  40  53 
Partnerships with domestic private-sector entities only  31  41 
Partnerships with both foreign and domestic entities  4  5 
Partnerships with 1 private-sector partner only  45  60 
Partnerships with 2–10 private-sector partners  27  36 
Partnerships with more than 10 private-sector partners  4  5 
Partnerships with multinational firms  23  31 
Crop-science firms  15  65 
Agri-food firms  6  26 
Other firms  2  9 
Partnerships with the public sector     
Partnerships with public-sector organizations   19  25 
Partnerships in agricultural biotechnology  14   
Multinational firms  7   
Total number of partnerships  75   
Source: Authors. 
a Budgets figures cited here refer to total project budgets as reported by the centers surveyed and refer to 
financial (but not in-kind) contributions. Financing sources may include donor agencies, private 
foundations, and other sources of funds. 
b Averages are given as median figures.
 
c This category includes public research organizations, public organizations, international organizations, 
international development organizations, advanced research institutes, nongovernmental organizations, 
community-based organizations, and public universities in both industrialized and developing countries 
(see Table 1). 
  The mean duration of a PPP in the CGIAR is approximately 4.2 years, ranging 
from several months to 12 years. In general, low-budget, short-term PPPs were associated 
with projects such as scientific exchanges with the private sector conducted at the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI). Big budget, long-term PPPs included both frontier  
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research projects at CIMMYT, ILRI, and IRRI that involve technology licensing 
agreements, and well-established multistakeholder platforms such as CLAYUCA and 
FLAR at CIAT. 
  More detailed findings show that 28 percent of PPPs reviewed exist for the 
purpose of sectoral or value-chain development, followed by resourcing (23 percent), 
contracting (21 percent), commercialization (16 percent), and frontier research (12 
percent). Findings further suggest that 47 percent of these PPPs aim to translate research 
outputs into products for the poor, followed by accessing knowledge from the private 
sector (24 percent), reducing research costs by partnering with the private sector (21 
percent), and bringing the center in closer contact with the poor (9 percent) (see Figure 
4).  
Figure 4. The goals of public–private partnerships in the CGIAR 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Access new  scientific knowledge from the private sector
Reduce research costs by partnering with the private sector
Translate research outputs into products for the poor
Bring the center into closer contact w ith the poor




Note: Data include reports of multiple goals for a given partnership. 
  When viewed together, these findings suggest that PPPs in the CGIAR are 
relatively concentrated in two main areas: pro-poor product development in technologies 
relating to crop production and value addition, and accessing knowledge from the private 
sector to further center research. These findings offer several additional insights that are 
summarized here and examined in detail below (see Figure 5).  













Reduce research costs Access new scientific knowledge
Develop pro-poor products Increase outreach to poor clients
•  While centers partner with both foreign and domestic entities, PPPs with 
foreign entities tend to be exclusive or monogamous, while PPPs with 
domestic entities tend to be larger, multistakeholder undertakings.   
•  The number of partners in a given PPP where domestic entities are key 
players suggests that some centers are playing a strategic role in private-sector 
development.  
•  Centers are generally collaborating with the private sector to generate 
additional resources for research, contract for scientific services and materials, 
and commercialize existing research outputs. However, centers are generally 
not using PPPs as a vehicle for jointly conducting cutting-edge science with 
the private sector. 
•  Centers are involving relatively few national agricultural research 
organizations in developing countries in their PPPs. 

























Note: Data include multiple responses on public–private partnership goals.  
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Domestic and Foreign Partners 
Partnerships with Domestic Entities 
As shown above, centers partner with a range of national and local private-sector entities 
in developing countries, including small firms, industry associations, producer 
associations, and private research organizations. Alternative partners may exist in the 
private sector, but they are rarely structured or organized to take advantage of small 
market opportunities or low-income clients. State-owned seed monopolies, for instance, 
have little or no incentive to exploit new markets or develop innovative products given 
their control over supply or price. Multinational firms, on the other hand, have limited 
interest in serving clients with limited purchasing power or market access, selling 
products for which they cannot recoup their R&D costs under weak regulatory regimes, 
or investing in the long-term—but uncertain—potential of emerging markets in many 
developing countries. The study identifies three modalities of partnering with domestic 
firms: 
1.  Commercialization of improved varieties, where domestic seed companies 
partner with centers to commercialize improved plant varieties or hybrids. 
While such firms may have varying capacity to conduct plant breeding, they 
generally bring market information and distribution networks to the 
partnership, thus assisting in moving center materials to end-users. Examples 
include ICRISAT’s Hybrid Parents Research Consortia. 
2.  Private-sector incubation, where centers operate programs, facilities, or 
support services to strengthen private-sector investment in agricultural 
research. Examples include ICRISAT’s Agri-Business Incubator (ABI) and 
CIAT’s AGRONATURA science park. 
3.  Multistakeholder platforms, where centers collaborate with domestic 
agroprocessing companies, producer associations, industry associations, and 
other entities to add value to a given agricultural commodity or develop its 
agricultural value chain. While many centers contribute to these platforms 
through plant breeding and related research, the centers’ main role is often one 
of convener or facilitator. Examples include CLAYUCA and FLAR at CIAT, 
or the Sustainable Tree Crop Program in IITA. 
These types of partnerships play a role in moving center research into commercial 
products and stimulating private-sector development. Each of these is examined below.  
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  First, these types of partnerships can play a vital role in strengthening the ability 
of centers to move research outputs into deployable products more rapidly, while 
simultaneously providing domestic firms with materials and expertise that contribute to 
their market competitiveness. This is particularly important for commodity-based centers 
such as ICRISAT. In India, ICRISAT’s Hybrid Parents Research Consortia brings 
together 34 small- and medium-sized domestic firms for the purpose of commercializing 
sorghum, millet, and pigeonpea hybrids, thus contributing to the commercial viability of 
both domestic seed firms and the wider seed market in India. In Mozambique, 
ICRISAT’s negotiations with Mozambique Leaf Tobacco (MLT) are opening up similar 
opportunities with a project that is expected to supply domestic seed companies with the 
materials and know-how to supply high-quality groundnut seed to smallholder tobacco 
farmers who are diversifying their farming practices to improve their long-term 
sustainability.  
  Second, these partnerships can play a role in stimulating private-sector 
development, often in countries where agricultural input markets are still emerging from 
the shadows of state-owned monopolies. By supplying improved materials to private 
firms, supporting these materials with investments in capacity strengthening, and 
supporting political advocacy on legal and regulatory issues, centers are ideally 
contributing to the development of efficient private markets and innovative firms. This 
issue is nontrivial to the success of the CGIAR. 
  CIAT, for example, hosts private companies and other research, technology, and 
development organizations at its AGRONATURA Science Park. Currently the park 
supports 16 research organizations, including several CGIAR centers, Colombian 
biotechnology companies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in 
development. The park not only provides physical space and opportunities for interaction 
with CIAT researchers, but also aims at building institutional relationships, financing 
new research projects, and promoting private-sector research by partnering the center 
with multiple public organizations and privates firms to promote research. Drawing on 
lessons learned from both FLAR and CLAYUCA, the AGRONATURA venture has  
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emerged as an important new means of promoting partnerships between CIAT research 
and the private sector. However, several issues are worth noting with respect to CGIAR 
partnerships with domestic firms, all of which are based on insights shared by key 
informants.  
  First, centers’ close relationships with small firms sometimes circumvent national 
research programs. The argument and its counter-argument—that many national research 
organizations are incapable of translating research into deliverable products of desirable 
and consistent quality for farmers—are old refrains among centers and their national 
partners in the public sector (see, for instance, World Bank 2004). While the findings 
presented here are unlikely to shed light on this continuing debate, it is worth noting that 
some centers are far more engaged with domestic firms (at the expense of their national 
public-sector partners) through their PPPs than others, suggesting that the degree of 
“circumventing” behavior varies across centers. 
  Second, the size and impact of PPPs that rely on domestic firms are often 
constrained by firm-level capacity and limited market infrastructure in developing 
countries. Consider CIMMYT’s Striga-Resistant Maize project, designed to develop and 
commercialize improve maize seed coated with an herbicide that provides the seed with 
resistance to a prolific weed found in East Africa. Only one of the three small domestic 
firms engaged in the project actually operates a breeding program, while all three are 
struggling to compete against the Kenya Seed Company, a company closely associated 
with government interests (though not directly state-owned) that still controls 86 percent 
of the Kenya maize seed market. 
  Third, centers have widely varying strategies on the extent to which they engage 
in the wider issue of local private-sector development. Centers such as ICRISAT and 
CIAT argue that the need to commercialize their own research and generate impacts on 
their target beneficiaries necessitates their investment in private-sector development at 
the domestic level. ILRI, on the other hand, chooses to play a relatively minor role in 
building private-sector capacity directly, instead focusing on its comparative advantage in  
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scientific research, while allocating private-sector development to its national partners.
12 
This arms-length approach to private-sector development differs from the approach taken 
by CIAT and ICRISAT and is significantly based on differences in organizational 
cultures and histories. 
Partnerships with Foreign Entities 
Centers also partner with many of the leading multinational firms in the crop-science 
sector—primarily industry leaders such as Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, and 
Monsanto. Of the 22 PPPs that involve multinational firms, 64 percent are collaborations 
with crop-science firms; 23 percent with agri-food firms; and 14 percent with other, 
largely biomedical, firms (Table 9). Of the 14 PPPs that involve some application of 
advanced agricultural biotechnology, just half involve multinational crop-science and 
biomedical firms. Findings further suggest four modalities of engagement with 
multinational firms: 
1.  Financing, where multinational firms and their charitable foundations provide 
funding to center research projects. 
2.  Technology transfers, where multinational firms license or donate proprietary 
knowledge to center research projects. 
3.  Frontier research, where multinational firms engage in joint research 
activities with a center that may include, but extend beyond, technology 
transfers. 
4.  Multistakeholder platforms, where multinational firms play active and often 
multiple roles in large platform projects to conduct research or develop value 
chains. 
  Partnerships between centers and foreign entities are often fraught with 
difficulties stemming from differences in organizational practice and behavior, and from 
the complexity associated with exchanges of proprietary knowledge and IPR. These 
issues are examined below, based on responses from key informant interviews. 
                                                 
12 Note, however, that ILRI does play a role in promoting private-sector development through 
evidence-based research and policy advocacy. ILRI’s project on Process and Partnerships for Pro-Poor 
Policy Change, for example, maintains close links to private-sector dairy development in East Africa and 
has been successful in effecting pro-poor policy change in Kenya.  
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Table 9. Public–private partnerships with the “Big 10s” in the crop-science and 










b  Center 
Crop-science sector       
Syngenta, Switzerland  7,270  7  CIMMYT, ICRISAT, 
Bioversity International, 
and IRRI 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 
United States 
4,830 5  CIMMYT, ICRISAT, 
and Bioversity Int’l 
Bayer Crop-Science, Germany  7,390  4  ICARDA, IFPRI,  
IRRI, and ICRISAT 
Monsanto, United States  5,220  2  IRRI 
BASF, Germany  4,170  2  CIMMYT 
Grupo Limagrain, France  965  1  CIMMYT 
Dow AgroSciences, United States  3,370  0   
Savia, Mexico  611  0   
Advanta, the Netherlands  398  0   
Agrifood sector      
Unilever, United 
Kingdom/Netherlands 
25,670 3  World Agroforestry 
Centre, IWMI 
Mars, United States  17,000  1  IITA 
Coca Cola, United States 19,564  1  ICRISAT 
Nestlé, Switzerland  54,254  0   
Kraft Foods, United States  29,723  0   
Pepsico, United States  25,112  0   
ADM, United States  23,454  0   
Tyson Foods, United States  23,367  0   
Cargill, United States  21,500  0   
ConAgra, United States  19,839  0   
Sources: Corporate and industry publications, personal communications, authors.  
Notes: CIMMYT is the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center; ICARDA, the International 
Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas; ICRISAT, the International Crops Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics; IFPRI, the International Food Policy Research Institute; IITA, the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture; IRRI, the International Livestock Research Institute; and IWMI, the 
International Water Management Institute. 
a Includes local subsidiaries and affiliates.  
b Excludes partnerships with a charitable foundation directly associated with the firm. 
  Differences in organizational practice and behavior are often confounding issues 
in planning and execution of a PPP. Multinational firms are often skilled at project  
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development, that is, figuring out what they want, what they can get, and under what 
terms they are willing to make an exchange, while centers are rarely as coherent in 
identifying or communicating their own needs. Although this may be partly attributable 
to information asymmetries—for example, the fact that centers rarely have information 
on technologies held by their private-sector counterparts, whereas the firm can probe 
center assets more easily through the public domain—the cultural differences are often a 
significant barrier to the partnership process. Furthermore, in terms of PPP execution, 
multinational firms are often more accustomed to making difficult project management 
decisions, for instance, terminating a project that fails to show results. Centers rarely take 
similar initiatives, nor do they face incentives to do so. These stark cultural differences 
make PPPs with multinational firms all the more challenging for centers. 
IPR and proprietary knowledge exchanges are also confounding issues for the 
CGIAR system and centers. Approximately 38 of the partnerships reviewed (51 percent 
of the total) involve the use or exchange of proprietary knowledge, suggesting that IPR is 
an important issue for consideration in the design and implementation of PPP projects. 
However, very few key informants suggest that the exchange of IPR between the public 
and private sectors is, in and of itself, a barrier to successful PPPs. Rather, the problem 
stems from issues of safe stewardship, asymmetrical information, and organizational 
experience. 
First, the exchange of IPR is often tied to the private firm’s concern with ensuring 
safe stewardship of their proprietary technologies and materials. The misuse or abuse of a 
private firm’s IPR by a center or a third party potentially exposes the firm—as the source 
of the IPR—to financial and reputational liabilities. Very few policy interventions or 
organizational mechanisms exist to manage or mitigate the risks associated with 
stewardship.  
Second, IPR exchanges are often constrained by a center’s limited ability to 
access information on a firm’s propriety knowledge assets. Few centers have extensive 
intellectual property management systems that allow them to search out secondary 
sources of information—patent filings, for instance—to identify useful proprietary  
  39 
knowledge assets available in the private sector. Other centers have entered into 
agreements with private firms that inhibit their ability to obtain such information from the 
firm’s competitor. This is the case in ILRI’s relationships with Merial, a private-sector 
partner participating in the East Coast Fever Vaccine project that is discussed further 
below. 
Third, IPR exchanges are often a function of the center’s ability to successfully 
negotiate with the private sector. To be sure, few centers have accumulated sufficient 
experience in the art of IPR negotiation. This may be partly because centers’ requests for 
proprietary assets are often marginalized by the private sector: the value of IP transferred 
from the private to the public sector is small (and of nominal value to the private sector) 
relative to the value of exchanges between private-sector entities, or relative to the 
importance of these exchanges to corporate strategies. This may also be due in part to the 
relatively undeveloped intellectual property management systems in some centers—
systems that limit a center’s ability to identify and evaluate its own proprietary assets, 
and thus negotiate more successfully with the private sector. 
Yet despite these issues, many of the older commodity centers, such as CIMMYT, 
ICRISAT and IRRI, continue to explore new relationships with foreign entities. 
Implicitly, these centers recognize that the materials, technologies, and expertise that 
these firms bring to the research process are invaluable to enhancing the CGIAR’s long-
term impact on agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. 
Public–Private Partnerships and Research Costs 
PPPs often reflect funding realities in the CGIAR. Pressure to forge creative relationships 
with new funding sources is a commonly recognized incentive underlying many PPPs in 
the CGIAR. However, findings also show that PPPs are widely used as a means of 
reducing research costs across a range of different types of PPPs. Findings specifically 
suggest that centers engage in three different types of cost-reduction modalities: 
1.  Making the prohibitive possible. Many PPPs are designed to overcome the 
prohibitive costs of conducting research in isolation by using the private  
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sector to provide access knowledge and technology, commercialize center 
research outputs, or engage in synergistic innovation processes. 
2.  Foundation funding. Of the 75 surveyed PPPs in the CGIAR, 9 (12 percent) 
include charitable foundations associated with corporate interests, including 
the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, the Monsanto Fund, the 
Barwale Foundation, and the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. By and large, these PPPs 
are designed to raise funds only.  
3.  Outsourcing and subcontracting. Five PPPs (7 percent) are largely 
collaborations that revolve around subcontracting information management 
systems tasks to the private sector. Examples include several IRRI projects 
designed to improve access to IRRI’s research through various software 
applications. 
  The cost issue, however, is not just about sustaining research and operations. Cost 
issues also figure into calculations of the firm’s need to minimize costs, maximize profits, 
and remain competitive; and the coordination costs incurred in the PPP itself. These 
issues are examined below based on responses from key informant interviews. 
Cost Reductions and the Domestic Firm  
Findings suggest that small domestic firms typically engage in PPPs to reduce costs and 
maximize profits. In such cases, the PPP provides them with opportunities to access new 
technologies that can significantly enhance their product lines, often within relatively 
short time horizons. For the multinational firm, PPPs are too small relative to their overall 
portfolios, or they are designed for a much longer time period to be relevant to the short-
term bottom line. Thus, the focus here is how PPPs contribute to reducing costs for the 
domestic firm by providing access to CGIAR materials that can give them an edge over 
the competition in the form of, say, a variety or hybrid with unique market value.  
  A key issue is whether firms are reducing costs or maximizing profits by gaining 
market power through exclusive access to CGIAR materials. Across the board, centers 
are adamant about their commitment to nonexclusivity. However, market structure, firm-
level capacity, or PPP design can provide private firms with de facto exclusivity and thus 
market power. For example, in regions where local seed markets are characterized by 
high levels of firm concentration, barriers to entry, and weak breeding capacity in the 
private sector could make it possible for a single firm with greater capacity in breeding or  
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marketing to build its market power using CGIAR materials more effectively than its 
competitors. According to a number of respondents to this study, these issues are 
potentially relevant in the context of several CIMMYT projects on maize improvement in 
eastern and southern Africa and ICRISAT’s Hybrid Parents Research Consortia for 
millet, sorghum, and pigeonpeas. While the centers maintain strict policies to ensure 
nonexclusive access, both market structure and project design may increase the chances 
of any one firm gaining implicit exclusivity over CGIAR material.
13  
  Having said that, these examples should not suggest that centers are knowingly 
providing exclusive access to the private sector, thereby reducing firm-level costs, 
increasing profits, and providing selected firms with an edge over the competition. Such 
conclusions would require further analysis of market structure and firm performance. 
However, these examples do suggest the CGIAR’s nonexclusivity mantra may be up for 
closer scrutiny, particularly given the growing importance of plant variety protection 
(PVP) regulations and other forms of IPR in some developing-country markets (for 
example, India or Kenya). 
  The possibility for partially exclusive licensing is entertained, albeit under a 
limited set of conditions, in several PPPs in the CGIAR. Documents describing the newly 
established Technology Innovation Center (a nonprofit foundation of ICRISAT designed 
to interface with the private sector, promote commercialization of ICRISAT technologies, 
and generate revenues for the center) suggest that the foundation will consider partially 
exclusive licensing to move ICRISAT research into commercialization, provided that the 
center’s mandate is not compromised. Documents describing CIAT’s alliance with 
Papalotla (a private firm operating in North America and Latin America) show that the 
firm receives exclusive rights for commercialization, multiplication, and marketing of a 
forage hybrid developed by CIAT in exchange for a 2 percent royalty on sales for CIAT 
(though only in countries where viable markets exist and only for the duration of the 
                                                 
13 For example, several key informants to this study argued that ICRISAT consortia membership fees 
(US$10,000 per year plus $500 per material transfer for certain lines) represented a potential entry barrier 
for smaller startup firms.  
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plant breeders’ rights conferred by those countries). In short, exclusive licensing is not 
unknown within the CGIAR and may become increasingly common. 
Cost Reductions and the Coordination Cost Offset  
Whereas the cost reductions described above are largely external to the PPP itself—
accruing directly to the firm or center—coordination costs are internal to the PPP as a 
whole. And while there is no easy way to quantify the costs of PPP coordination, that is, 
the costs incurred in searching for partners, maintaining partner commitment, and 
resolving conflicts among partners, findings strongly suggest that within-partnership 
coordination costs are a major challenge to successful PPPs. 
  The nature of these coordination problems differs across PPPs and can be 
illustrated by several examples. First, consider ILRI’s above-mentioned East Coast Fever 
Vaccine project, a PPP designed to develop a vaccine that could reduce livestock 
productivity losses in the order of US$300 million per year, thereby curbing the disease’s 
negative impact on the incomes and nutrition of African smallholders and pastoralists. 
According to the current terms of agreement between ILRI and its private-sector partner, 
Merial, the center’s contact with other firms with respect to vaccine research is subject to 
prior discussion with Merial. Given that the animal health sector comprises far more 
players than the crop-science sector, the agreement terms generate prohibitively high 
search costs for ILRI to identify new research partners with potentially useful 
technologies. 
  Next, consider the case of CIMMYT’s Striga-Resistant Maize project. According 
to key informants, the project was temporarily beset by deep coordination problems 
arising from the poorly defined roles and responsibilities assigned to the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF). AATF, a latecomer to the project, was the 
subject of several misunderstandings, miscommunications, and conflicts that generated a 
significant level of tension within the project. Although AATF’s role and responsibilities 
have since been clarified, several partners remain skeptical of the organization, unclear of 
its position in the project (is it a donor, a researcher, a service provider, or simply a free-
rider?), and resentful of its initial missteps (for example, releasing maize seed for farmer  
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trials under the AATF name). The mistrust and misperceptions generated by these events 
represent significant coordination costs for the PPP. 
  In the case of FLAR and CLAYUCA at CIAT, coordination costs relate more to 
the time and effort needed to organize and administer these multistakeholder platforms. 
Both initiatives are independent legal entities established on the basis of agreements 
between CIAT and producers associations and private firms in Latin America. CIAT 
performs R&D based on requests from their governing boards and plays a central role in 
the management and administration. But the coordination costs associated with these 
roles are substantial. Costs include representational functions, administering funds, 
managing relationships and financial contributions from existing partners, identifying and 
acquiring new partners and funding opportunities, and, importantly, reviewing and 
approving all administrative decisions made by the initiatives’ members. At present, 4 of 
the 14 staff employed by CLAYUCA work on administrative and communications issues, 
while 5 of the 28 staff do so for FLAR.  
Public–Private Partnerships and Innovation 
The CGIAR’s contribution to agricultural development rests partly on its ability to foster 
innovation, that is, the successful introduction of knowledge and technology into an 
economically or socially relevant process (OECD 1997, 1999). Close examination of the 
CGIAR’s PPPs suggests that the overwhelming majority is designed to reduce costs, raise 
funds, or transfer knowledge and technology from the private sector, but not to innovate 
in partnership with the private sector. In short, centers are generally not using PPPs as a 
vehicle for joint processes of technological innovation wherein partners collaborate on 
the planning and execution of project activities. Having said this, centers are generally 
benefiting from PPPs as a result of the organizational innovations they foster, and as a 
result of increased engagement in critical downstream innovation activities. These issues 
are discussed in detail below.  
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Co-Innovation  
Findings suggest that 12 percent of PPPs in the CGIAR (a total of nine projects) revolve 
around technology donations or licensing from private firms to centers for the purposes of 
scientific research. Examples include ICARDA’s projects on stress-resistance in 
chickpeas and lentils, and IRRI’s work on Bt rice, beta carotene-enhanced (“golden”) 
rice, and rice genomics. 
  While technology transfers are important to the centers’ work, the question is 
whether they truly bring public- and private-sector expertise to bear on a given research 
challenge. Several examples demonstrate how PPPs extend beyond technology transfers 
to include joint planning and execution of research through repeated and durable 
interactions, that is, joint processes of technological innovation or “co-innovation.” 
CIMMYT’s apomixis research project is a classic example of a joint innovation process, 
as is ILRI’s East Coast Fever Vaccine project, as is discussed below. 
  ILRI’s East Coast Fever Vaccine partnership specifically demonstrates the value 
of shifting from technology transfer to joint innovation. The project began in 1999 with 
partners from the public sector and advanced research institutes: Merial only joined later 
after a period of observation and negotiation. But since joining, Merial’s contribution to 
the project has evolved into a mutually beneficial process of exchange and learning for 
both the center and company. The back-and-forth exchange of knowledge and technology 
between the partners has accelerated the pace of research and made outcomes possible 
that the center could not have achieved in isolation. It has also changed the way ILRI 
does business with the private sector, a point explored further below. Moreover, partners 
on both sides of the table believe that the project is on track to deliver a vaccine that 
could significantly reduce smallholder losses to East Coast Fever in East Africa.  
  Given the limited number of PPPs designed to facilitate joint innovation processes 
and outcomes, findings suggest that the CGIAR’s interactions with the private sector are 
generally not combining explicit knowledge exchange (for example, donated or licensed 
technologies) with more tacit forms of knowledge exchange. Examples of tacit 
knowledge exchanges include experiential learning approaches to research in which  
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knowledge is transferred through modalities such as learning by doing or learning 
through face-to-face interaction, hands-on collaboration, scientific exchange programs, 
and so on. 
Organizational Innovation  
Whatever impact PPPs have on technological innovation in the CGIAR, findings suggest 
that their effect on organizational innovation is significant. PPPs are changing the way 
some centers do business, specifically, their structures, practices, and models of 
conducting research. PPPs are providing centers with useful insight into industry 
perspectives—the shortest route to launching an end product, the need to terminate 
projects when they fail to perform, and the importance of demand-side or market 
analysis—and how center research can incorporate such perspectives. Experiences at 
ICRISAT and ILRI are particularly telling in this respect. 
  These insights are helping centers keep research projects on track, meet donors’ 
short-term project horizons, and ultimately contribute to real impacts among target 
beneficiaries. More importantly, these insights are helping centers learn and transform 
themselves beyond original conceptions of brick-and-mortar research facilities into key 
players within dynamic innovation networks.  
  CIAT and ICRISAT, among many other centers, have demonstrated significant 
progress in this regard, while staying true to their mandate. ICRISAT, for example, has 
learned the importance of building relationships with the private sector. Funding 
pressures in the 1990s caused the center to seek new ways of sustaining itself, leading to 
a variety of relationships with the private sector. Over time, ICRISAT’s portfolio has 
come to include activities (many of which are discussed in this study) that support 
private-sector incubation and capacity strengthening, funding from charitable foundations 
associated with the private sector, and wide-ranging programs to commercialize its 
technologies through the private sector.   
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Downstream Innovation  
Part of this transformation process includes recognition among some centers that their 
research should contribute more to enhancing the performance of agricultural value 
chains that move commodities from production to consumption. Of the 22 PPPs on 
sectoral/value-chain development, 14 (67 percent) focus specifically on value chain 
development.
14 Activities include increasing smallholder participation and 
competitiveness in high-value markets, strengthening the role of producer associations 
and other collective action institutions, developing and deploying technologies that 
respond to identified market opportunities, and building market linkages and 
infrastructure. Examples include projects such as Papa Andina at CIP, watershed 
innovations at ICRISAT, CLAYUCA at CIAT, and Allanblackia development from 
smallholder cultivation at the World Agroforestry Centre. 
  Another useful example of this type of PPP is CIAT’s Diversity Agriculture 
Project Alliance (DAPA), a program that aims to improve the competitiveness of 
smallholders and their involvement in specialty coffee and other high-value markets, such 
as medicinal plants, forage crops, and horticulture. DAPA’s industry partners include, for 
example, international coffee buyers interested in addressing development-related aspects 
of the crop, including environmental sustainability, product quality, and returns to 
smallholders. The project provides smallholders with access to specialty markets and 
buyers, and provides buyers with information about the origin and quality of coffees that 
can return premium prices in high-value foreign markets. While the private sector’s 
financial contributions have been largely in kind, their technical assistance on such issues 
as quality analysis has been a substantial contribution to smallholders. CIAT’s 
contribution focuses on strengthening smallholder participation in value-chain 
opportunities, a priority research area for the center and the CGIAR as a whole. 
  PPPs along the value chain are often complex undertakings. They require 
contributions of extensive tacit knowledge from multiple actors across both time and 
                                                 
14 The remaining 7 percent of PPPs involving sectoral/value chain development focus on input and 
seed sector development.  
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space, contributions that are often difficult to manage and evaluate. They require public-
sector partners to relinquish their control over the traditional modalities of research and 
extension, and instead seek to understand and collaborate with private-sector concerns. 
They also draw centers into activities that may make little use of their research 
capabilities or into activities where centers have a limited comparative advantage. 
However, it may be the case that such issues are offset by the benefits accruing from 
greater understanding of the demand-side of agricultural research, more immediate or 
visible impact, new funding sources, and more relevant participation in national 
development dialogues. Still, the tension between the CGIAR’s system-level research 
priorities, on the one hand, and the center-level desire to move into more downstream 
activities with less research orientation (but possibly more visible impact and attribution 
of success to the center), on the other, was a commonly articulated concern throughout 
the key informant interviews.  
Public–Private Partnerships and Risk 
The majority of research projects, whether conducted in the public or the private sector, is 
beset by certain types of risks. Covariate risk, for instance, emerges from the wider social 
and political environment in which research is conducted, or beneficiaries and end-users 
are targeted, or the economic and financial climate in which research investments are 
made. The heated global discourse over agricultural biotechnology and especially 
genetically modified organisms in crops and livestock, for example, poses risks for many 
of the CGIAR’s PPPs in agbiotech. The long decline in donor funding for agricultural 
research beginning in the late 1980s suggested similar risks. 
  In the context of research, however, emphasis is typically placed on idiosyncratic 
risks—those associated with the probability that the research process will not yield a 
successful output or product, will yield a success along a time horizon that is too long for 
continued private investment, or will yield a product that cannot pass through legal and 
regulatory hurdles associated with moving from proof of concept to commercial  
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deployment. Necessarily, these types of risks are part of the culture underlying research 
and are often justified by the potential returns to a successful research process.  
  Several types of idiosyncratic risks are unique to PPPs. They include the risks 
associated with weak financial infrastructure, coordination among diverse partners, and 
exchanges of proprietary knowledge assets. These risks are discussed in detail below. 
Transferring Risk  
Research that is characterized by some uncertain outcome requires a means of sharing or 
transferring risk from those who are least able to those who are most able to bear it. Both 
the formal financial sector and the government play a role in transferring risk by 
financing private research either through private investment (for example, venture 
capital) or through public expenditures (for example, programs designed to 
commercialize research).  
  Often, such formal private financing and public-sector programs are weak—if not 
nonexistent—in the agricultural research sector in developing countries. For example, 
domestic seed firms that invest in breeding programs may have limited access to financial 
markets or public programs (relative, say, to firms in the manufacturing or service 
sectors) and thus limited means to transfer the risks of a breeding project to others.  
  Consider, for example, the Western Seed Company, a small firm in Kenya with 
in-house breeding capacity that plays an active role in several PPPs with CIMMYT, such 
as the Striga-Resistant Maize and Quality Protein Maize projects. The firm’s 
participation in these projects is partly or wholly financed by the firm’s own resources 
and includes testing, releasing, and producing breeder seed. As a small firm in a 
competitive market where formal financing for seed firms is uncommon, the Western 
Seed Company assumes an extensive level of risk by engaging in these PPPs. In the 
absence of formal (private or public) mechanisms to transfer risk, the Western Seed 
Company must fully absorb the risks posed by difficult regulatory barriers, adverse 
climatic shocks, and other vagaries that affect the seed business. These types of risk are 
of considerable importance to smaller domestic firms partnering with the CGIAR.  
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Risk and Coordination 
The failure to sustain commitment between partners—whether through formal 
mechanisms, such as contract adherence and execution, or informal commitment 
mechanisms, such as trust-building activities and communication—is another major risk 
facing PPPs in the CGIAR. 
  Consider, for example, the Drought Tolerant Crop Initiative, a PPP–based 
platform organized to develop and deliver new technological innovations to drought-
prone, food-insecure farmers in developing countries. Despite the platform’s strong focus 
on product development and deployment, the initial interest of key players in both the 
public and the private sectors, and some well-planned efforts to launch the initiative, 
evidence suggests that the PPP has failed to take off.
15  
  What went wrong? Published proceedings of discussions among key parties 
suggest that stumbling blocks included distrust of private-sector motivations and 
incentives, recognition that regulatory regimes and market infrastructure in many 
countries were insufficiently developed to attract private participation in the delivery of 
end-products to smallholders, and concerns over the specific technologies under 
consideration. But possibly the most important stumbling block was the lack of 
resources—in terms of people, time, money, and energy—needed to organize and 
coordinate the initiative. Here, as in many PPPs, coordination costs and system-level 
failure contributed significantly to the probability of success. 
Risk and Knowledge Assets 
Risk issues in CGIAR partnerships often relate to the exchange and use of improved 
germplasm, hybrid parent lines, transgenic constructs, and other such assets held by 
centers or their private partners. For the center, the issue of risk is often associated with 
attempts by private firms to assert control over assets held in trust for the public good. 
For the multinational firm, the issue of risk is more about the transfer and use of IPR to 
the public sector and the possibility that materials and technologies may fall into the 
                                                 
15 See Doering, 2005a,b,c. Note, however, that other drought-tolerance research projects have operated 
in parallel with this initiative or have subsequently been initiated (for example, CGIAR 2006b).  
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hands of competitors or parties who might misuse or abuse the materials and 
technologies. This can potentially damage the firm’s reputation or brand, incur legal or 
criminal liability for the firm, and do harm to the firm’s public-sector and civil society 
partners as well.    
  Consider, for instance, CIMMYT’s project on Insect-Resistant Maize for Africa 
(IRMA). The project aims to introduce pest resistance traits conferred by Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) into maize varieties and hybrids commonly cultivated in East Africa. 
While the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture provides considerable 
funding for the project, the project makes use of Bt events available in the public domain 
only—in this case, a transgenic event from a Canadian university. The choice to use a 
public event rather than one developed by the foundation’s parent company, Syngenta, 
reduces the exposure of public-sector partners to reputational risk resulting from possible 
associations with corporate interests being drawn by third-party observers. 
  But even the best-laid plans for mitigating risk can fail, as experiences from this 
same project illustrate. In August 2005, a technician at the Kenya Institute of Agricultural 
Research accidentally treated a test plot containing Bt maize with pesticide, thus ruining 
the experiment. Press reports followed soon after with allegations from the chair of 
Kenya’s National Biosafety Committee that the project had succumbed to pressure from 
international organizations to sidestep regulatory procedures (see, for example, Sunday 
Nation 2005). While the allegations proved to be untrue, the project partners’ slow 
response to the public and political damage caused by press reports suggests that the 
absence of an effective communications (and damage control) strategy was a setback for 
the project. 
To be fair, CIMMYT’s experience is not unique in the CGIAR. The global 
discourse surrounding such controversial topics as agricultural biotechnology, genetically 
modified organisms, globalization, and litigation against multinational firms has exposed 
centers and their partners to multiple risks, primarily with regard to safe stewardship. 
Risks posed to the CGIAR’s reputational integrity result from PPPs with crop-science 
firms such as Bayer Crop-Science, Monsanto, and Syngenta manifest in ongoing  
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criticism from watchdog organizations and by the disengagement of the CGIAR’s own 
NGO Partnership Committee.
16 Similar risks may also emerge from PPPs that engage 
companies representing controversial products, such as tobacco (IITA and the British 
American Tobacco Foundation, or ICRISAT and MLT, a subsidiary of Universal Leaf 
and a major supplier to Philip Morris).
17  
Risk Management and Mitigation Tools 
This is not to say that risks make the PPP approach expendable: rather, centers need to 
have effective risk assessment, management and mitigation strategies in place to 
safeguard their research, financing, and reputational integrity should a worst-case 
scenario materialize. Risk management and mitigation strategies for both individual 
partners and the PPP as a whole are discussed below. 
Precautionary strategies. The default strategy for the CGIAR is one of caution: 
transfer materials to traditional public-sector partners only, and minimize contact and 
exchanges with the private sector. However, this strategy may be difficult to sustain in 
light of centers’ commitments to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA), which stipulate that materials held in the public trust will be 
made available to both public and private parties.  
The default strategy for the private sector—particularly foreign entities such as 
multinational firms—is similarly cautious. Many firms choose to disengage from the 
development-through-partnership agenda and limit their interactions with centers, or they 
only share technologies and materials of relatively low commercial value or that pose 
relatively low risk should they fall into the hands of competitors or be misuse by third 
parties. However, this precautionary strategy may also limit the ability of such firms to 
                                                 
16 See, for example, criticism of the CGIAR from GRAIN (2001) and deGrassi and Rosset (2003); and 
an account of the CGIAR NGO Partnership Committee’s disengagement in NGOC (2002) and Bezanson, 
Narain, and Prante (2004). 
17 In 2003, the British American Tobacco Foundation (BATF) committed 7.0 million Nigerian naira 
(approximately US$ 52,000) to fund the AGo-Are Development Project in Nigeria, in which IITA was a 
stakeholder (IITA 2003).  
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gain access to emerging markets in developing countries, breeding materials from 
centers, or other valuable information or assets. In the case of CIMMYT’s Insect-
Resistant Maize for Africa project, for example, application of the precautionary strategy 
was implicit in the decision to use a transgenic event available in the public domain. 
However, several respondents noted that this choice may have also affected the pace of 
R&D under the project.  
Legal and contractual strategies. Legal and contractual strategies offer the next-
best option to risk management. Such strategies are common in PPPs where the operative 
relationship is based on technology licensing and material transfers or requires strong 
measures to ensure safe stewardship of proprietary technologies and materials. In these 
types of partnerships, explicit contractual agreements formalize the roles and 
relationships among parties; ensure that parties jointly plan and execute activities to 
accomplish agreed objectives; and distribute costs, risks, and benefits equitably. 
Provisions such as indemnifications and warranty disclaimers may be included to provide 
partial protection to the licensor or seller or a technology from the actions of the licensee 
or buyer.  
The recent creation of organizations designed to facilitate legal and contractual 
agreements in partnership-based research projects illustrates this strategy. The African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation, for example, is mandated to facilitate the transfer of 
technologies (including, but not limited to, advanced biotechnologies) between research 
organizations in the public and private sectors. In doing so, AATF provides the 
expertise—individuals with significant experience in agricultural science, 
communications, legal affairs, and regulatory affairs—needed to design and negotiate 
formal agreements that address the risks associated with PPPs.  
Still, it is important to recognize that regardless of how skilled organizations such 
AATF are at mitigating risk through legal recourse, or how well the centers’ own legal 
capabilities are developed, they are still likely to be limited relative to those of the 
multinational firms with which they partner. Thus, several respondents argued the need to 
bolster legal expertise at the system- or center-level sufficiently for the CGIAR to  
  53 
confidentially navigate protracted litigation or negotiate with batteries of lawyers from 
the private sector. Most others, however, felt that legal recourse offered little benefit to 
any of the parties to a partnership: rather, they argued that legal recourse would only lead 
to costly litigation and the loss of good faith among partners, thus harming project 
implementation and the long-term growth of public–private partnerships. Moreover, 
many argued that legal recourse is difficult to pursue in developing countries, where legal 
and regulatory regimes are rarely equipped to address the complex issues underlying 
PPPs and technology development.  
Yet there is some evidence to suggest that the legal context within which the 
CGIAR operates is changing, thus necessitating greater legal expertise in centers and the 
system. New regimes governing IPR exchange, biosafety regulation, and agricultural 
trade are emerging in many developing countries where the CGIAR conducts research, 
while some centers are finding themselves more exposed to host-country regulations that 
govern R&D than in past decades. This changing context has led ICRISAT, for example, 
to establish a separate entity—the Technology Innovation Centre (TIC), a U.S.–registered 
foundation operating in India—to commercialize new technologies with the private sector 
and absorb some of the associated risks (see TIC 2005). 
Financial strategies. Missing in many PPP projects are financial strategies to 
transfer the risks borne by small domestic firms, as described above. Financial 
mechanisms, such as commercial loan guarantees from public sector partners, small 
grants administered through competitive schemes, or credit programs managed by 
charitable foundations could play a role in mitigating some of these risks. Several 
programs along these lines are being developed (for instance, under the Forum for 
Agricultural Research in Africa [FARA]), but it remains to be seen whether the programs 
will be open to small firms, entrepreneurs, and other private-sector actors operating in 
markets where the formal financial infrastructure needed to transfer and share risk 
remains weak or nonexistent.  
Communications strategies. Formal risk management strategies, such as those 
described above, are only as strong as the communications strategies behind them.  
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Communications strategies are designed to manage and mitigate risk through efforts that 
include building social and political support for a given PPP, educating end-users on 
proper product stewardship practices, informing beneficiaries and observers of the 
potential benefits of the PPP through appropriate media channels, and preparing 
provisions to mitigate damage caused by worst-case scenarios. 
Illustrative of a proactive risk-management strategy is ICRISAT’s efforts to 
mainstream its Agri-Science Park (of which the Agri-Business Incubator is a part) into 
Andhra Pradesh’s wider “Genome Valley” initiative. ICRISAT’s strategic efforts to gain 
political endorsement and support from the government as part of the state’s own 
strategic initiative in research and innovation can potentially insulate the center from 
political risk, even in the volatile environment of state-level politics in India. 
 Platform-building strategies. A critical risk-management strategy for the 
successful PPP—like any investment project—is proper design and funding. This often 
requires that the PPP be established on a solid platform that allows the relevant parties to 
come to agreement on a common objective and to commit resources to achieve that 
objective. The platform may be an informal coalition of organizations, a coalition headed 
and managed by a lead organization, or a legal entity established to manage the project 
with some degree of decisionmaking independence from the partners themselves.  
Elements of a successful platform include clear definition of the problem, its 
solution, and the resources needed to achieve the solution; establishment of benchmarks 
to gauge progress and decide on next steps; and effective communication channels to all 
key stakeholders through which to exchange knowledge, resolve conflicts, and change 
course as needed. While many PPPs in the CGIAR attempt to build such platforms, 
findings suggest that the absence of a solid platform, as illustrated earlier with the 
Drought-Tolerant Crop Initiative, is the single-most important determinant of success. 
The importance of platform-building is also seen in the case in CIAT, which 
operates a separate PPP unit designed to catalyze partnerships by assisting in the 
promotion of collaborative undertakings, identification of common interests, and design 
of the organizational structure. The unit’s main functions include identifying possible  
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business opportunities and partners, organizing roundtables and conferences where 
potential partners are brought together on topics of mutual interest, and providing 
advisory services on organizational design to deal with PPP governance, management, 
and administration issues.  
In summary, PPPs are fraught with risk for centers and their private-sector 
partners. Precautionary, legal, and financial provisions are needed, as are effective 
communications platform-building strategies, PPP management units, and foresight into 
the worst-case scenario. By and large, these strategies are not commonly used or 
available to PPPs in the CGIAR. 
Public–Private Partnerships and Poverty 
Do PPPs enhance the impact of research by improving outreach to the poor? The poverty 
orientation of PPPs is a topic of extensive discussion within the CGIAR. However, this 
study does not attempt to evaluate the poverty impacts of each PPP examined here: center 
management and impact evaluators are better positioned to undertake those analyses. 
Rather, this study suggests different ways of looking at the poverty orientation issue. 
Impact Pathways 
Poverty orientation is closely related to the issue of impact pathways, that is, the specific 
channels through which agricultural research contributes to food security and poverty 
reduction. Impact pathways operate through research that enhances crop yields, output, 
and quality; improves the sustainable use of natural resources; and fosters the 
accumulation of physical and human capital in vulnerable households. The impact 
pathways may also be less direct, operating on a sectoral level by increasing the returns to 
collective action through producer associations, or by improving nonfarm employment 
opportunities in agro-processing and other fields. Ultimately, these outcomes translate 
into impacts in the form of higher incomes, greater food consumption, better nutrition, 
and favorable changes in the allocation of individual and household assets for small-
scale, resource-poor farmers; food-insecure households; and other marginalized social 
groups.   
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For instance, the choice of crop in a PPP suggests much about the poverty focus. 
Certain (largely food staple) crops are prioritized by the CGIAR because cultivar 
improvements have direct, beneficial impacts on the incomes and nutrition of small-scale 
producers or food-insecure consumers; thus, they are critical to achieving sustainable 
food security and reducing poverty. This includes research on the traditional CGIAR 
focus crops, such as maize, rice, wheat, legumes, and pulses, as well as cattle and small 
ruminants.  
Other (largely specialized commercial) crops may generate similarly direct 
impacts or indirect impacts, such as growth in the demand for agricultural labor and 
nonfarm rural labor, or in the application of innovative natural resources management 
practices. But they may also bear a greater chance of generating direct or indirect benefits 
for large farmers, large-scale farming operations, or corporate agriculture, depending on 
the particular country or region. This includes research on crops such as oil palm, 
ornamentals, bananas, coffee, and cotton, all of which are covered by PPPs in the 
CGIAR. 
Choice of Partners, Level of Partnership 
The choice of crop is only part of the story. Of equal importance is the choice of partners 
and the level at which the partners operate. Many PPPs operate at relatively high level of 
aggregation––for example, multistakeholder platforms that operate around a particular 
crop or value chain. Examples include CIAT’s role in CLAYUCA or FLAR, where the 
center plays an important convening role, the World Agroforestry Centre’s role in the 
development of the Allanblackia value chain, or IITA’s role in the Sustainable Tree Crop 
Program. These PPPs yield indirect impacts by mobilizing large numbers of key actors 
around the improvement a single crop or its value chain. To the extent that center 
participation extends beyond a convening or supportive role to these platforms, then such 
PPPs can have significant impacts on poverty. But where the center’s role aggregates at a 
higher, more formal level, or where mission creep diverts the center from its comparative 
advantage in research, then further analysis of real poverty impact might be warranted.   
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PPPs aggregating at a lower level can incur some of the same problems. For 
example, the science parks at ICRISAT and CIAT, while designed to promote small-scale 
entrepreneurship and private investment in agricultural research, aggregate among a 
number of small firms that may simply be benefiting from the facilities and expertise 
offered by the center. The poverty impacts of their operations are largely indirect and 
unevaluated, suggesting the need for further analysis.  
Findings suggest that PPPs operate through three different impact pathways, as 
follows: 
1.   Household impacts result from PPPs that focus on research and dissemination 
of crops, traits, and technologies that are directly relevant to the incomes and 
nutrition of small-scale producers, agricultural laborers, or food-insecure 
consumers. Included in this are the vast majority of PPPs designed to 
commercialize center research. 
2.  Sectoral impacts result from PPPs that focus on research that benefits other 
agents in agriculture and agricultural research by enhancing competitiveness 
in specific value chains, creating employment opportunities, and generating 
public revenues through the taxation of private-sector activities. This includes 
the science parks and private-sector development initiatives described above. 
3.  Intergenerational impacts result from PPPs that are designed to preserve and 
unlock genetic diversity and natural resources for future generations. Centers 
conducting genetic improvement are acutely aware of the tradeoff between 
protecting local endowments of indigenous genetic resources, publicly 
improved varieties, and natural resources, and the need to exploit the 
information and knowledge embodied in these assets for use by future 
generations.  
The key issue with respect to PPPs and poverty is the identification of the right 
interventions—crops, traits, and technologies—specifically targeting the poor, and the 
right partners—public, private, and civil society—to conduct the project. Best practices 
are captured in projects where partners clearly identify and document the pro-poor 
potential of a given intervention. Less desirable practices might include  
•  exclusive licensing of technologies for seed that may affect market structure 
and the availability of seed to smallholders without sufficient ex ante 
assessment of the poverty impacts generated by the research; 
•  allocation of center facilities and expertise to conduct research on high-value 
cash crops outside the CGIAR mandate (for example, cotton, flowers, and oil  
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palm) for which alternative suppliers of research may exist, or from which 
cross-subsidies for more poverty-oriented research are not forthcoming; and 
•  ad hoc proposals to sell potential technologies in segregated markets 
(subsidized rates for poor clients, market rates for others) without ex ante 
evaluation of market size, structure, infrastructure, and the effects that 
segregation will have on the technology’s price and market performance.   
  These examples are not meant to spotlight particular centers or projects. They do, 
however, point out the critical importance of conducting ex ante analysis of the poverty 
impact pathways through which a PPP operates.   
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Findings from this study suggest that PPPs in the CGIAR are serving a wide variety of 
research objectives, ranging from the system’s traditional emphasis on increasing food 
security by increasing yield and output, to new pathways through which to reduce 
poverty such as value-chain development. This trend further suggests that centers are 
widening their focus from research for technological innovation, to innovation at both a 
systemic/societal level and an internal/organizational level. Implicit in this shift is a 
greater awareness of the demand for research derived from markets for both food staple 
and high-value agricultural commodities. 
Nevertheless, findings also suggest that, while the CGIAR’s interactions with the 
private sector are generally designed to overcome some of the market failures and 
institutional constraints described earlier, they are not addressing many of the wider 
systemic weaknesses associated with knowledge exchange. Specifically, few PPPs in the 
CGIAR are combining explicit knowledge exchange, such as technology donations or 
experiential learning approaches in which knowledge is transferred via learning by doing, 
learning through face-to-face interaction, hands-on collaboration, and public–private 
scientific exchange programs. 
Nevertheless, these findings are far from universal for the CGIAR. Specific 
findings from this study paint a more nuanced picture of PPPs in the CGIAR and their 
influence on system and center performance and output:  
•  PPPs in the CGIAR are concentrated in the development of pro-poor 
technologies and products relating to crop production and value addition, and 
in the transfer of knowledge and technology from the private sector to further 
center research.  
•  Centers are partnering with both foreign (that is, industrialized-country) firms 
and domestic (that is, developing-country) firms. A significantly larger 
proportion of PPPs involving foreign firms are either exclusive (limited to the 
agreed set partners) or “monogamous” (involving only one partner) 
arrangements, whereas PPPs involving domestic firms are typically larger 
multistakeholder undertakings.  
•  The cost reductions afforded by PPPs translate into competitive advantages 
for domestic firms and provide centers with the ability to conduct research  
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that otherwise would be prohibitively costly. Nevertheless, in some instances, 
cost reductions may be offset by the costs of coordinating the PPP itself. 
•  While centers are using PPPs effectively to commercialize and deploy new 
technologies and products with local relevance, concerns that PPPs may 
supplant the role of their national partners persist. 
•  PPPs are contributing significantly to changing the way centers do business, 
both in terms of internal practices and behaviors and in terms of external trust-
building and networking with the private sector. 
•  PPPs are generally not vehicles through which centers engage in joint 
processes of technological innovation where partners collaborate on the 
planning and execution of project activities.  
•  PPPs are generally not designed with risk assessment, management, and 
mitigation strategies in mind, thereby exposing both the partnership and its 
partners to significant challenges and threats.  
•  PPPs are rarely designed with sufficient analysis of the direct and indirect 
pathways through which the research will affect the poor. 
The findings suggest that successful PPPs are predicated on several conditions 
that have implications for how centers and their private-sector partners organize, govern, 
and implement partnership-based projects––that is, how they overcome market failure, 
institutional constraints, and systemic weaknesses. While these conditions are not 
universally applicable to all centers and projects in all instances, they do provide insight 
into key areas where partnership-strengthening activities could be focused. Specific 
recommendations include the need for the following: 
•  a platform on which to assemble relevant partners, identify incentive 
compatibility, agree on mutual objectives, and assign roles and responsibilities 
appropriately;  
•  resource commitments from all partners, not only to a project’s research 
activities, but also to the coordination activities needed to manage and sustain 
partners’ commitment; 
•  organizational mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and 
resolve conflicts arising from the process; 
•  benchmarks and decision-points that allow partners to evaluate progress, 
revise the course of a project, and terminate the project as necessary; 
•  strategies to manage and mitigate the risks associated with projects, including 
both formal legal and financial strategies and informal strategies that 
emphasize external communications and political support; and   
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•  explicit ex ante and ex post analysis of the impact pathways through which 
projects affect the marginalized social groups that it targets. 
It is important to note that these elements are useful not only for generating 
additional resources for research, contracting scientific services and materials, or 
commercializing center research, but also in promoting greater joint innovation by the 
public and private sectors, from which may emerge many innovative solutions to 
agricultural production and productivity constraints. In short, using PPPs to fund research 
is beneficial, but not enough to contribute to agricultural development and poverty 
reduction. 
It is also important to note that a “one size fits all” approach to PPPs is 
counterproductive to the goal of increasing food security and reducing poverty in 
developing countries. The deployment of pro-poor knowledge and technology requires 
different—and often creative—approaches to R&D. Creativity itself requires that both 
public- and the private-sector organizations become more innovative in the ways they 
conduct business and build strategic relationships with each other. Without organizational 
innovation within the CGIAR and among its partners, pro-poor technological innovation 
would largely be impossible. 
These findings represent an attempt to close the gap between the popular rhetoric 
in support of PPPs and the general absence of rigorous analysis. However, the findings 
also suggest the need for further study of PPPs in agricultural research. Further analysis is 
recommended specifically with respect to research partnerships between national 
agricultural research organizations and the private sector, partnerships intended to combat 
neglected diseases in developing countries, and other areas where PPPs are being used to 
promote economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries.  
This final recommendation is not meant to simply generate new research on PPPs; 
rather, new research is viewed as a necessity in light of the high expectations of the 
development community on the one hand, and the low level of interest and effort among 
key partners on the other. These realities suggest a real risk that policymakers, research 
managers, and private-sector leaders will become dissatisfied with the PPP approach. 
Such dissatisfaction would be detrimental to the research, development, and  
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dissemination of pro-poor knowledge and technology. What is needed, then, is greater 
financial and intellectual investment in harvesting the potential of PPPs, and transforming 
them into tools that support small-scale farmers, food-insecure households, and other 
marginalized social groups in developing countries.   
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APPENDIX A. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1.  What is your organization’s primary mission and main activities?  
2.  What are your organizations’ main competencies or skills?   
3.  Please give a brief description of the partnership project that your organization is 
participating in. Who do you collaborate with in this project? 
4.  How is this project helping to reduce poverty and/or improve smallholder 
livelihoods? 
5.  What is the project duration and its annual budget? What are the main contributions 
to this project by your organization?  
6.  What are the main benefits from the project for your organization? 
7.  How is the project governed and managed, and what role does your organization 
play? 
8.  How much time, effort, and resources are required to coordinate the project and its 
partners? 
9.  What types of risks has your organization faced in this project 
10.  Has the project undergone any changes since implementation began, and what has 
been the response to these changes in (a) the project itself, and (b) your 
organization? 
11.  Have project partners faced any conflicts since implementation began, and how 
have conflicts been resolved among partners? 
12.  What lessons have you learned from this project, and how would you improve it?  
13.  Is it necessary to improve the relationships in this project? How would you improve 
the relationships between/among partners?  
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APPENDIX B. EMAIL SURVEY 
For each of your center’s public–private partnership projects, we would kindly ask you to 
answer a few short questions, as follows.  
1. Project  title 
2. Date  established 
3. Project  location 
4. Project  duration 
5.  Names of partner organizations/companies 
6.  Total project budget (a rough estimate is sufficient) 
7.  Main project outputs 
8.  Which of the following would most appropriately describe the purpose of the 
partnership? 
____  Resourcing partnerships in which CGIAR centers receive funding from 
philanthropic foundations associated with private firms or receive scientific 
expertise from private firms.  
____  Contracting partnerships in which CGIAR facilities or expertise are contracted to 
private firms or CGIAR centers contract private firms to conduct research. 
____ Commercialization  partnerships in which CGIAR centers transfer research 
findings and materials to private firms for commercialization and distribution. 
____  Frontier research partnerships in which CGIAR centers jointly undertake research 
activities characterized by some unknown probability of success.  
____  Sector and value-chain development partnerships in which CGIAR centers work 
with a networks of public, private, and civil society partners. 
9.  Which of the following would most appropriately describe the immediate goal of 
the project: 
____  The project was designed to access new scientific knowledge from the private 
sector.  
____  The project was designed to reduce research costs by partnering with the private 
sector.  
____  The project was designed to translate research outputs into products for the poor.  
____  The project was designed to bring your center into closer contact with the poor. 
10.  Optional: what lessons has your center learned from this project? 
    
    
   
RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
707.  Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification in Ethiopia: A Review of Evidence and Experience. Derek Byerlee, 
David J. Spielman, Dawit Alemu, and Madhur Gautam, 2007. 
706.  Sistemas de Innovación Piscícola en la Amazonia Boliviana: Efectos de la Interacción Social y de las 
Capacidades de Absorción de los Pequeños Agricultores.  Frank Hartwich, Vicente Eguez Camacho, Mario 
Monge, y Luis Ampuero Ramos, 2007. 
705.  The Role of Clustering in Rural Industrialization:A Case Study of the Footwear Industry in Wenzhou. Zuhui 
Huang, Xiaobo Zhang, and Yunwei Zhu, 2007. 
704.  The Economics of GM Food Labels: An Evaluation of Mandatory Labeling Proposals in India. Sangeeta 
Bansal, Bharat Ramaswami, 2007. 
703.  The Power Mapping Tool: A Method for the Empirical Research of Power Relations. Eva Schiffer, 2007. 
702.  The Bang for the Birr: Public Expenditures and Rural Welfare in Ethiopia. Tewodaj Mogues, Gezahegn Ayele, 
and Zelekawork Paulos, 2007. 
701.  Public Spending and Poverty Reduction in an Oil-Based Economy: The Case of Yemen. Mohamed A. 
Chemingui, 2007.  
700.  Integrated Management of the Blue Nile Basin in Ethiopia: Hydropower and Irrigation Modeling. Paul J. 
Block, 2007.  
699.  Building Public-Private Partnerships for Agricultural Innovation in Latin America. Suresh Babu, Maria 
Veronica Gottret, Frank Hartwich, and Jaime Tola, 2007.  
698.  Cost Implications of Agricultural Land Degradation in Ghana: An Economywide, Multimarket Model 
Assessment. Xinshen Diao and Daniel B. Sarpong, 2007.  
697.  Is HIV/AIDS Undermining Botswana’s ‘Success Story’? Implications for Development Strategy. James 
Thurlow, 2007. 
696.  Supermarket Purchases and the Dietary Patterns of Households in Guatemala. Abay Asfaw, 2007. 
695.  Agricultural Growth Linkages in Ethiopia: Estimates using Fixed and Flexible Price Models. Xinshen Diao, 
Belay Fekadu, Steven Haggblade, Alemayebu Seyoum Teffesse, Kessu Wamisbo, and Bingxin Yu, 2007.  
694.   Is the Relationship Between Aid and Economic Growth Nonlinear?. Andros Kourtellos, Chih Ming Tan, and 
Xiaobo Zhang, 2007. 
693.  Regional Disparities in Ghana: Policy Options and Public Investment Implications. Ramatu M. Al-Hassan and 
Xinshen Diao, 2007. 
692.  Innovación en el Cultivo del Maní en Bolivia: Efectos de la Interacción Social y de las Capacidades de 
Absorción de los Pequeños Productores. Frank Hartwich, Tito Arispe, y Mario Monge. 2007. 
691.  Marriage, Schooling, and Excess Mortality in Prime-Age Adults: Evidence from South Africa. 
Futoshi Yamauchi, 2007. 
690.  Renegotiating the Food Aid Convention: Background, Context, and Issues. John Hoddinott and Marc J. Cohen, 
2007.  
689.  Agricultural Growth and Investment Options for Poverty Reduction in Rwanda. Xinshen Diao, Shenggen Fan, 
Sam Kanyarukiga, and Bingxin Yu, 2007. 
  
 




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 